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I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 12(2)' of the Securities Act of 1933 allows the buyer' of securities to sue his seller for damages where the seller has
misrepresented a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made by the seller during the
course of the transaction not misleading. Until recently, this express cause of action was a relatively sleepy cousin of Rule 10b-5,4
overshadowed by the explosive growth of this implied remedy,5
which was invoked by buyers defrauded during the course of securities transactions in both the distribution markets6 and-the secondary trading markets.'

1 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3 Defrauded sellers have no cause of action under the 1933 Act. By its own terms,
section 12(2) extends relief only to defrauded purchasers. Although the language of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act has been interpreted to extend relief to defrauded sellers,
Louis LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcuRImEs REGULATION § 9A-1, at 700-01 (2d ed. 1988),
most courts have been reluctant to imply a private cause of action under section 17(a),
limiting its availability to criminal prosecutions and .to the SEC for administrative proceedings. See THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 7.6, at 344, and
§ 7.8, at 356-57 (2d ed. 1990).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1992). The failure of section 12(2) to extend relief to
the defrauded seller is often given as a primary reason for creating Rule 10b-5 and implying a civil remedy thereunder. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 355 (10th Cir.
1970); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 15.01, at 15-1 to 15-2
(1993); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS: CASES' AND MATERIALS 944-48 (4th ed.
1990); Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Ad of 1933 for
Fraudulent Trading in Post-Distribution Mar*ets, 32 WM. & MARY L REV. 847, 873 n.143
(1991).
5 Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (requiring the Rule 101>5 plaintiff to prove scienter on the part of the defendant), greater attention has been paid to section 12(2), with its lesser burden on the
plaintiff as to defendant's knowledge. See Thomas L Hazen, A Look Beyond the Pruning of
Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 64 VA. L REV.
641, 644 n.15 (1978); Dan Childers, Recent Developments, Securities Regulation-Sandersv.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc.-UndrurriterLiability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Ad of
1933, J. CORP. LAW 157 (Fall 1981); Catherine Masters Epstein, Comment, Reasonable Care
in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 372 (1981).
6 Distribution markets are the primary securities markets wherein issuers raise capital by selling securities to investors through public offerings or private placements or
other types of exempt financings. BLOOMENTHAi, supra note 4, at § 3.01; RICHARD W.
JENNINGS ET AL, SEcuRITIES REGULATION 5 (7th ed. 1992); Maynard, supra note 4, at 848
n.9.
7 Secondary markets (also known as trading or post-distribution markets) are securities markets which provide liquidity for investors who have purchased securities in the
distribution markets by providing an organized marketplace for the continuous trading of
previously issued securities. BLOOMENTHAL, supra, note 4, § 3.02; JENNINGS, supra note 6,
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Significant controversy currently brews, however, over the
question of whether the express cause of action for rescissionary
damages available under section 12(2) extends to the purchaser
defrauded in secondary market transactions The district courts are
split on this question, but the majority of the reported decisions
agree with the conclusion of the Third Circuit in Ballay v. Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc.9 In the first reported appellate decision to
address this issue squarely, the Third Circuit concluded that section 12(2) relief was not available to defrauded secondary market
buyers, reasoning that the 1933 Act was intended primarily to
regulate the distribution markets. Accordingly, the Third Circuit
concluded that section 12(2) relief is limited to only those buyers
defrauded during the course of distribution transactions.
However, legal scholars,"° as well as practicing members of
the securities bar," have largely rejected the Third Circuit's reasoning. Moreover, in May 1993, the Seventh Circuit weighed in on
this debate and concluded that the statute on its face affords relief
to those secondary market buyers who otherwise satisfy the statutory prerequisites of this express cause of action. 2 In reaching this
conclusion, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the express language
of section 12(2) and its relationship to other relevant provisions of

at 5; Maynard, supra note 4, at 848 n.9.
8 See generally BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, § 14.05[4]; Louis Loss, The Assault on
Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HAkv. L. REv. 908 (1992) [hereinafter Loss, The Assault on
§ 12(2)]; Louis Loss, Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAW. 47 (1992) [hereinafter Loss, A Rebuttal]; Maynard, supra note 4; Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55 ALB. L. REV. 97 (1991); Elliott J. Weiss, The
Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 BUS. LAW.
1 (1992); Adam D. Hirsch, Note, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the
Aflermarket, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 955 (1990); Catherine Zucal, Note, Does Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 Apply to Secondary Trading?: Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.,
65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1179 (1991).
9 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
10 See generally Loss, The Assault on § 12(2), supra note 8.
11 See Steven W. Hansen et al., Developments in Broker-Customer Litigation, 25 REv. SEC.
& COMMODITIES L 193 (1992); Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role of Securities Act Section
12(2) as an Aftermarket Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 BuS. LAW 711 (1992). Since
Ballay was decided, much has been written about the legislative history of the 1933 Act,
and of section 12(2) in particular. See, e.g., Loss, A Rebuttal, supra note 8; Prentice, supra
note 8; Rapp, sup-a; Weiss, supra note 8. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out, however,
nothing in the legislative history contradicts the express language of the statute. Pacific
Dunlop Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 592 (7th Cir. 1993).
12 Pacfic Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582. For a more thorough analysis of the reasoning
employed by the Third Circuit in Ballay as contrasted with that of the Seventh Circuit in
Pacific Dunlop, see Therese H. Maynard, Section 12(2)"s Availability to the Defrauded Secondary
Market Buyer, 7 INSIGHTs 21 (August 1993).
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the federal securities -laws.'" Furthermore, in its examination of
the legislative history of the 1933 Act as a whole and of section
12(2) specifically, the Seventh Circuit found no-basis for limiting
section 12(2) relief to only those buyers who purchase in distribution transactions. 4 Thus, under the Seventh Circuit's approach,
the primary limitation on the availability of section 12(2) relief is
the express privity requirement of section 12(2)," 5 not an implied
standing limitation based on a conclusion that Congress intended
the 1933 Act to regulate only
distribution transactions, as the
6
Third Circuit held in Ballay.1
Since the Ballay decision was handed down in 1991, many
observers have expressed concern about the broadened scope of
liability that would be imposed on participants in the secondary
trading markets, including members of the securities brokerage
industry, if the section 12(2) cause of action were made available
to buyers in the post-distribution markets.' These concerns, how-

13 The rubric of "federal securities laws" generally refers to seven statutes. Congress
enacted the first six statutes between 1933 and 1940: the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. TV 1992); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Trust Indenture Act of
1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Investment Company Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -64 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Congress enacted the seventh statute in 1970, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa78111 (1988). See also 15 ,U.S.C. § 78c(a)(47) (1988) (as amended, defining "securities
laws" to include these seven acts).
14 Padfic Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 595.
15 The language of the statute expressly limits the plaintiff-buyer's section 12(2) suit
to only those persons who sold the securities to the plaintiff, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). See
also infra Part II.D for further analysis of the statute's privity requirement.
16 See, e.g., Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d 578; PPM America v. Marriott Corp., 820 F.
Supp. 970 (D. Md. 1993); Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp. 432 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The
author examines these cases in detail in her forthcoming article, The Future of Litigation
Under Securities Ad Section 12(2), to be published in the symposium issue of the ALA. L
REV. (Fall 1993); accordingly, extended analysis of these cases is outside the scope of this
Article.
17 See Prentice, supra note 8 at 104, 138. To the extent that concern over a threatened flood of litigation by secondary market buyers against their sellers is urged as a
basis for denying section 12(2) relief to the defrauded buyer in the post-distribution
market, the scope of this potential liability exposure--and particularly that of securities
professionals such as broker-dealers--must be placed in the proper context. This Article
seeks to provide that context by analyzing how section 12(2) would apply to sellers in
the trading markets, with particular focus on the scope of liability of the broker-dealer as
a prospective section 12(2) defendant. The Article also demonstrates that the concerns
about making section 12(2)'relief available to post-distribution buyers are greatly exaggerated. Accordingly, fears about the disproportionate liability exposure of section 12(2)
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ever, are misplaced. Indeed, as this Article will demonstrate, the
express requirements of section 12(2), in and of themselves, create
safety valves that prevent crushing liability wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the defendant-seller's underlying wrongful conduct.
At the outset, the express requirement of privity between the
plaintiff-buyer and the defendant-seller is an important limitation
that significantly narrows the scope of potential section 12(2)
liability by holding secondary market sellers liable to only those
buyers in privity with that defendant-seller." More importantly,
section 12(2) expressly provides the seller with the affirmative
defense of reasonable care; 9 thus, the defendant-seller may resist
the buyer's section 12(2) suit by claiming that she' exercised the
requisite degree of care. Surprisingly little, however, has been
written about the section 12(2) defense of reasonable care," and
only a handful of reported decisions specifically address this aspect
of the section 12(2) remedy.
From both a litigation and preventive law perspective, however, it is important to define the standard of care that a seller must
exercise so that she may conduct her business affairs and trading
activities in the secondary markets without jeopardizing her ability
to claim this affirmative defense. From the perspective of a member of the securities industry, the defense of reasonable care must
be regarded as one of. the most important safeguards underlying
this express cause of action. This defense affords the section 12(2)
defendant-seller a mechanism wholly within her control by which
she can avoid "crushing liability" for her post-distribution trading
sellers, particularly Broker-Dealer Sellers, are misplaced and do not justify denying the
section 12(2) express cause of action to the defrauded secondary market buyer.
18 The prospective class of section 12(2) defendant-sellers is limited by the express
privity requirement of section 12. The defrauded buyer may obtain relief only from the
individual(s) who sold the security to him by way of a materially misleading misrepresentation or omission. See infra Part II.D for further analysis of this privity requirement.
Moreover, any section 12(2) defendant may seek to resist liability by refuting the other
elements of section 12(2). For example, she may claim that the alleged misrepresentation
or omission did not relate to a "material" fact; see infra notes 84-86 (discussing the relevant standard for materiality).
19 Section 12(2)'s reasonable care defense requires the seller to "sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
20 Throughout this Article, the pronoun "she" refers to section 12(2) defendantsellers and the pronoun "he" refers to the post-distribution buyer suing under section 12(2).
21 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, § 14.05, at 14-15; see also Loss, supra note 3, at 89495; and Epstein, supra note 5.
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activities. Indeed, as the question of the scope of section 12(2)
winds its way to the United States Supreme Court for ultimate
resolution,' it is important to understand and emphasize that the
statute itself affords adequate safeguards to prevent draconian
liability in claims made by defrauded secondary market buyers
against their sellers under section 12(2).'
This Article therefore focuses its analysis on the seller's section 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care, emphasizing the
availability of this defense to the broker-dealer acting as a seller in
a post-distribution market transaction.2 4 Part II briefly describes
the elements of a section 12(2) cause of action to demonstrate
how the statute, by its very terms, limits the availability of this
express cause of action. This section will demonstrate that the
statute's express requirement of privity, coupled with the other
elements of this express cause of action, pose a significant barrier
to recovery of substantial damages from secondary market sellers,
including securities broker-dealers. Part III continues this discussion by examining the dearth of existing case law analyzing the
reasonable care standard contained in the section 12(2) affirmative defense. This discussion will demonstrate that, historically, the
courts have relied on a flexible approach in analyzing the statute's
reasonable care standard, emphasizing a variety of factors, including the nature of the defendant-seller.
Part IV of the Article is divided into three subparts. Each
subpart analyzes the section 12(2) reasonable care standard from
the perspective of one of three different classes of prospective

22 Ellen Joan Pollock, Law: Suing Over Prospectus, WALL ST. J., 'May 12, 1993, at B7.
In light of the fundamental disagreement regarding the proper scope of section 12(2)
relief, this issue will likely make its way to the United States Supreme Court. See
Maynard, supra note 4, at 849, 892; Maynard, supra note 12, at 21; Prentice, supra note
8, at 142.
23 In deciding whether to allow the defrauded post-distribution buyer to sue under
section 12(2), the Supreme Court presumably will be sensitive to the question of whether
this rule of standing will "open the floodgates" of litigation. See e.g., Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976). As this Article demonstrates, however, -this
express cause of action is carefully tailored, see infra Part II, and further, it provides the
defendant-seller with an affirmative defense that allows the scrupulous seller to conduct
her dealings so as to avoid culpability under section 12(2). See infra Part IV.
24 This Article, therefore, assumes that Pacific Dunlop was correctly decided and that
a section 12(2) cause of action does exist on behalf of the defrauded post-distribution
buyer. Accordingly, this Article's analysis of the parameters of the section 12(2) reasonable care defense should provide further support for the position that Balay was wrongly
decided and, therefore, when the issue is finally before it, the Supreme Court should
conclude that section 12(2) relief is available to the defrauded secondary market buyer.
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.section 12(2) defendant-sellers in the secondary markets.'
Subpart (A) deals with an ordinary seller: one who is neither a
control person of the issuer of the securities that are the subject
of sale, nor a securities professional (hereinafter an "Ordinary Seller"). Next, subpart (B) examines the situation of a seller-who is a
"control person"" of the issuer of the securities that are the subject of the sale (hereinafter a "Control Person Seller"). Finally,
subpart (C) focuses on a seller who, as a member of the securities
brokerage industry, buys and sells securities for her own account
and/or the account of others (hereinafter a "Broker-Dealer Seller")." The objective of each subpart of Part IV is to describe the
criteria for applying the section 12(2) reasonable care defense to
each respective category of prospective secondary market sellers.
This analysis will demonstrate that, generally, the least onerous
standard of reasonable care applies to the transaction involving
the Ordinary Seller and the most onerous burden will be imposed
on the Control Person Seller.8
Trading market transactions involving a Broker-Dealer Seller,
however, pose the most complex analysis of the relevant standard
of reasonable care.' In this situation, analysis of the section
12(2) affirmative defense is further complicated by fiduciary duty
principles that derive from both common law agency principles
and the federal securities laws. These fiduciary duties, generally
not relevant to other classes of prospective section 12(2) sellers,
play a crucial role in defining the scope of the broker-dealer's
reasonable care burden as a section 12(2) seller in a secondary
market transaction.
Because the most frequent targets of section 12(2) suits arising out of secondary market sales activity are likely to be brokerdealers," Part IV emphasizes the relevant criteria to be applied in

25 While not exhaustive, the classification scheme used in this Article covers most of
the customary participants in the secondary markets.
26 See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text, which address the concept of control.
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12) (1988) (defining the statute's use of the term "dealer" to
include brokers as well as those persons who trade for their own account); 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1988).
28 See infra Parts IV.A (discussing the scope of Ordinary Seller's liability under section 12(2)), IV.B (discussing the scope of Control Person Seller's liability under section 12(2)).
29 See infra Part IV.C.
30 Se&ePrentice, supra note 8, at 104; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Symposium,
19 PEPP. L. REV. 1105, 1113 (1992).
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analyzing the section 12(2) defense from the perspective of the
Broker-Dealer Seller. The analysis of the broker-dealer's exercise of
reasonable care demonstrates that section 12(2) liability is not a
monster of draconian proportions-at least not where the brokerdealer conducts her business affairs properly, by scrupulously complying with the. otherwise. applicable fiduciary duty principles that
govern the broker-dealer's ielationship with her customers. This
analysis of the section 12(2) reasonable care defense thus provides
guidelines to the broker-dealer community for conducting their
future dealings in the secondary markets to avoid section 12(2)
liability, thereby preserving the basis for their section 12(2) affirmative defense.
The Article concludes in Part V by recommending that the
courts continue to adhere to a flexible, fact-oriented approach to
the application of the seller's section 12(2) affirmative defense.3"
The contrasting situations posed by the various classes of potential
section 12(2) defendant-sellers reinforce the need for such judicial
flexibility in describing the nature of section 12(2)'s reasonable
care requirement."2 The relevant standard for the seller's exercise
of reasonable care is not capable of definition with any mathemat-

31 Accordingly, it is appropriate to rely on common law to provide further refinement of the flexible approach recommended in this Article. However, the development
of standards for the exercise of reasonable care sufficient to establish the section 12(2)
defense-at least as to Broker-Dealer Sellers-will be affected by the brokerage industry's
increasing use of arbitration clauses in its agreements with its customers. Because the
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of these *arbitration clauses, see Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), increasing reliance has been placed on arbitration to resolve customers' disputes with their broker-dealers. Obviously, reliance on the arbitration
process to resolve these disputes will impact the common law evolution of standards for
the broker-dealer's exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2). See generally, David A.
Lipton, The Standard on Which Arbitrators Base Their Decisions: The SROs Must Decide, 16 SEC.
REG. LJ. 3 (1988). Detailed examination of the impact of arbitration on the development
of common law standards, however, lies outside the scope of this Article.
32 Indeed, section 1703(f) of the American Law Institute's FEDERAL SECURrIES CODE,
which is the proposed successor to section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, requires the defendant
to establish that "he reasonably did not believe that there was a misrepresentation." Section 202(131) defines "reasonably" to require the defendant to exercise "reasonable care,"
with the further admonition that "the questions whether reasonable care requires an
investigation or inquiry and, if so, its extent are left to construction in context and in
the light of the circumstances." See also 9 Louis Loss & JOEL SEuGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4211 n.70 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1992). To provide more substantive guidance
to the broker-dealer community, the SEC might be called upon to develop a safe harbor
provision in a manner similar to the SEC's adoption of Rule 176, which gives guidance
to the broker-dealer industry as to the scope of the reasonable investigation requirement
of section 11 of the 1933 Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1992).
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ical precision as to any potential category of section 12(2) seller.
Rather, a fact-intensive analysis is required, including a careful
balancing of the criteria identified in Part IV of the Article, of
which the most important is the nature of the section 12(2) defendant-seller.
II.

ELEMENTS OF SECTION

12(2) CAUSE OF ACTION

Any analysis of the provisions of the federal securities laws
must start with the statute's language."3 By its terms, section
12(2) entitles the purchaser of a security to rescission from his
seller (or, in the event that the purchaser no longer owns the
security, to receive damages equivalent to rescission) if the purchaser can establish that (1) the seller used the facilities of interstate commerce or the mails; (2) to offer to sell or to sell securities to the purchaser; (3) by means of a "prospectus" or oral communication; (4) that misstated or omitted a material fact; (5) of
which the purchaser did not have knowledge; (6) unless the seller
sustains the burden of proving that she did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth
or omission.'
A detailed examination of each of these elements indicates
that, contrary to the Third Circuit's ruling in Ballay, "[s]ection
12(2) on its face applies to the offer or sale of any security," S5

whether such purchase is made in the primary or secondary market. Given the possibility that section 12(2) relief could be extended to fraudulent secondary market trading, the facts of Ballay
present a good illustration of the type of recurring transactions
involving Broker-Dealer Sellers' that some commentators fear will
spawn a flood of deleterious litigation, perhaps ultimately threatening the financial integrity of the brokerage industry as a whole.
This Part, therefore, will analyze the elements of section 12(2)
relief against the facts of the Ballay case. By applying the required
elements of section 12(2) to the facts of the secondary market
transactions at issue in Ballay, this Part will demonstrate that the

33 See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976).
34 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988); see alsoJohns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124,
1128 (4th Cir. 1970); Monetary Management Group v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 615 F.
Supp. 1217, 1222 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
35 Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosion of the P'ivity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities
Ad of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 928 n.18 (1984).
36 See Steinberg, supra note 30, at 1113.
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restrictions Congress placed on this remedy, in and of themselves,
severely limit the availability of section 12(2) relief. More importantly, this Part will demonstrate that the liability exposure of
defendant-sellers is curtailed further by the statute's affirmative
defense of reasonable care. As applied to the type of secondary
market transactions at issue in Ballay, the elements of the section
12(2) cause of action allow the meritorious plaintiff to prevail, but
do not result in draconian damage awards wholly out of proportion to the nature of the defendant-seller's wrongful conduct.
A.

The Facts of Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

In Ballay, several investors sued the brokerage firm of Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc. ("Legg Mason") on account of alleged
7 and its representatives
oral misrepresentations made by the firm
concerning the book value calculation of certain securities of the
Wickes Company ("Wickes"). The- investors claimed that Legg
Mason had touted these securities as a promising investment in
the undervalued stock of a company that showed significant potential for future growth.' Relying on these representations, the
plaintiffs purchased Wickes securities in the secondary markets
using the brokerage services of Legg Mason during the period
from June 1986 through August 1987.11
Legg Mason analysts tracked the performance of companies
whose profiles complied with the investment criteria underlying
the Legg Mason "value philosophy" of investing, a philosophy that
was widely promoted to its clients." In furtherance of this investment strategy, Legg Mason often produced research reports regarding the securities of companies that it had identified as attractive investment opportunities.
One such company, Wickes, had emerged from bankruptcy
protection in January 1985 and had pursued a restructuring course
that involved sizeable acquisitions as well as dispositions of certain
of its holdings.4 From June 1986 through November 1987, Legg

37 Bailay, 925 F.2d at 684. Legg Mason was registered as a broker-dealer under the
1934 Act. Id. at 685. The potential liability under section 12(2) of a securities professional registered only under the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-1 to -21 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), lies outside the scope of this Article.
38 Ba/aly, 925 F.2d at 685.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Mason recommended investment in Wickes securities" by means
of an interoffice "squawk box" that disseminated the firm's recommendations to its representatives." Legg Mason also communicated these recommendations in various writings, which were circulated to both the clients and the brokers of the Legg Mason firm."
One such communication over the squawk box mistakenly reported that Wickes had a book value of $5 per share excluding goodwill." Subsequently, Legg Mason's research reports contained various other references to the valuation of the goodwill of Wickes, all
of which were erroneous." On November 27, 1987, and December 17, 1987, Legg Mason corrected these prior misleading statements in a report which clarified the calculation of Wickes' book
value, including the value of goodwill.47 The plaintiff investors, all
clients of Legg Mason, had purchased Wickes stock prior to the
dissemination of these curative investment reports of November
and December.
Following the Third Circuit's ruling in Ballay, several commentators have suggested that imposition of liability on a broker-dealer
firm (such as Legg Mason) for communications directed to buyers
in the secondary market (such as the research reports disseminated by Legg Mason to its customers) could lead to an overwhelming volume of lawsuits against Broker-Dealer Sellers that would
threaten the very viability of the brokerage industry. This Part will
demonstrate, however, that the underlying philosophy of the 1933
Act is intended to eliminate the very type of misrepresentations of
material fact reflected in the Ballay fact pattern. At the same time,
the reasonable care defense and other procedural safeguards expressly afforded under section 12(2) are designed to protect sellers, including Broker-Dealer Sellers such as Legg Mason, against
the very type of unwarranted, crushing liability that is so feared.
B.

Interstate Commerce

Despite a dearth of reported cases under section 12(2) dealing specifically with the jurisdictional issue of interstate commerce,
commentators generally agree "that the misrepresentation itself
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

at 685-86.
at 685.
at 686.
at 685-86
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need not have been made in interstate commerce; the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied if the mails or interstate commerce were
utilized for any part of the transaction."4 9 In deciding whether a
plaintiff has satisfied the interstate commerce requirement, courts
generally look to the entire transaction, not to its isolated parts.'
For example, in Ballay, as to many of the forty-three plaintiffs, the
fiaudulent communications were made orally, in face-to-face communications, or perhaps during the course of telephone conversations. The use of the telephone generally will be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction."' Moreover, the use of the facilities of interstate commerce need not coincide with the misrepresentation or
omission that is the subject of the 12(2) cause of action. It is
enough that the use of interstate commerce occurs in connection
with the offer or sale of securities. 2

49 Martin I. Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How
It Compares With Rule 106-5, 13 Hous. L REv. 231, 240 (1976).
50 I. at 240 n.43. See also JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 1252-53; Hill York Corp. v.
America Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971).
51 Only one case has directly confronted the issue of whether a purely intrastate
telephone call satisfies the interstate commerce requirement of section 12(2). Lennerth v.
Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964). That court held that any use of the
telephone is sufficient. Id. at 63 ("Use of the telephone is the use of a means of interstate communication."). But see Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (holding
that intrastate phone call was sufficient use of interstate commerce to give federal courts
jurisdiction under rule 10b-5, but distinguishing similar language under section 12(2)),
cerL denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968). Most commentators agree, however, that an intrastate
telephone call is sufficient to give rise to jurisdiction under section 12(2) because the
same telephone wires carry both intrastate and interstate messages. See JENNINGS, supra
note 6, at 1252-53; 8 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 3927-28; 1 id. at 430 n.96.
52 See, e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1979); Franklin Sav.
Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977); Moses v. Michael, 292 F.2d 614
(5th Cir. 1961); Cresswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1959);
Blackwell v. Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cet. granted, 346 U.S. 908 (1953), and cert.
dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d
Cir. 1943). But see Kemper v. Lohnes, 173 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding that facilities
of interstate commerce must carry the misrepresentation or omission itself to state section 12(2) cause of action).
In Wigand, for example, the defendant seller made several oral misrepresentations
to the plaintiff buyer in a series of face-to-face meetings regarding a negotiated merger
between two companies in which the two parties were majority shareholders. Wigand, 609
F.2d at 1031-32. After the parties consummated the transaction, the defendant mailed a
stock certificate to the plaintiff representing the purchase of 25,000 shares. Id. at 1032.
The court held that the transfer by mail of the stock certificate was sufficient to support
jurisdiction under section 12(2) even though use of the mail was collateral to the real
transaction and the defendant's misrepresentations. Id. at 1033.
Similarly, in Lennerth, the defendant made an intrastate telephone "call to the plaintiff to arrange the face-to-face meeting at which the defendant made the oral misrepresentations which were the subject of the plaintiff's section 12(2) cause of action. Lennrwth,
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In secondary market transactions, most of the trades executed
on behalf of customers, such as the clients of Legg Mason, are
executed on the exchanges or in the over-the-counter (OTC) market through the facilities sponsored by the National Association of
Securities Dealers." Access to these markets generally depends on
some use of the telephone, computerized wire messages, or other
forms of communication devices that necessarily implicate the "use
of the facilities of interstate commerce." Accordingly, jurisdiction
in these types of secondary market trading cases should not be
difficult to establish.'
C.

"Sale" of a "Security"

Second, the plaintiff must show that he was a purchaser in a
transaction involving the sale of a security.' Section 2(3) of the
1933 Act defines the term "sale." The original issuance of securities, conventionally referred to as a distribution transaction,' is a
sale under this definition." Courts, however, have treated many

234 F. Supp. at 63. The misrepresentations themselves were not carried by the facilities
of interstate commerce. However, because the intrastate phone call was connected with
the transaction, jurisdiction was proper. Id.
53 The National Association of Securities Dealers (the "NASD") is registered under
section 15A of the 1934 Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1938 to authorize SEC
registration and regulation of a new kind of self-regulatory organization known as "national securities associations." The NASD is the only such organization of its type. Today,
most over-the-counter equity trading is handled through the NASDAQ quotation system,
the automated quotation system sponsored by the NASD. 5 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note
32, at 2580. The NASD, as part of its ongoing effort to enhance its competitive posture,
has adopted several measures to automate many of the steps involved in the OTC trading process. For a more detailed discussion of the technological improvements and other
developments that have enabled the OTC market to match orders and otherwise develop
execution capability, see id. at 2578-91; Michael J. Simon & Robert LD. Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L.REV. 17, 21 (1986).
54 9 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 4208-11. Generally, some aspects of the
activity involved in a secondary market transaction-typically involving the broker-dealer's
routing of an order deposited by the customer with the broker-dealer (in person or
through some other means of communication) to the destination market (whether it be
an exchange facility or some other dealer in the OTC market) for execution in that
market-will involve the use of the facilities of interstate commerce at some point,
thereby creating the basis for federal jurisdiction. Id.
55 See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) (defining the term
"security"). This threshold issue is likewise jurisdictional. See JENNINGS, supra note 6, at
264-65; 9 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 4198-99; Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1971).
56 See supra note 5.
57 See 9 Loss & SEuGMAN, supra note 32, at 4199; In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79
F.R1D. 283, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1978); In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 115-16 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
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transactions occurring in the secondary markets, including mergers,s stock exchanges, and stock pledges,59 as sales under this
definition.
Indeed, the Ballay court did not dispute that plaintiffs' purchase of securities from the defendant broker-dealer firm was a
"sale" as that term is defined in section 2(3). In Ballay, the plaintiff-buyers brought a section 12(2) suit against their broker based.
on the broker's alleged misrepresentations concerning the book
value of certain Wickes securities that the plaintiffs purchased
during the regular course of trading transactions in the secondary
market. The Third Circuit did not rule that these trading transactions did not involve the "sale" of a "security." Instead, the court
reasoned that such a sale was outside the protections of section
12(2) of the 1933 Act because the sale did not occur during the
course of a "distribution" transaction.'
The approach of the Third Circuit in Ballay on the sale element of the section 12(2) cause of action is laudable because it is
consistent with other courts' prior interpretation of the term "sale"
as used in other provisions of the federal securities laws, including
other aspects of the 1933 Act.' At first blush, this interpretation
may appear to lead to an overly expansive view of the brokerdealer's potential liability under section 12(2), since most purchasers in secondary market trades, like the plaintiffs in Ballay, rely on
a broker-dealer for their participation in, and access to, these
markets.6 2 However, the courts' broad interpretation of "sale," as
underscored by the Ballay decision, will not open the floodgates of
litigation because other more restrictive components of this ex-

58 See, e.g., Folder Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., 938 F.2d 1529 (2d Cir.), cei. denied, 112
S. Ct. 587 (1991); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1359 (5th Cir. 1981). Mergers and
certain other forms of business combinations are likewise treated as sales under the
SEC's Rule 145. 17 C.F.R. § 230.145 (1992).
59 See, e.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 428-31 (1981) (holding that pledge
of securities is a sale).
60 Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. 925 F.2d 682, 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 79 (1991).
61 United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); Loss, A Rebutta supra note 8, at
52-55.
62 Most purchasers need the assistance of a broker-dealer to gain access to secondary
trading markets because the markets only permit member broker-dealers to execute
trades in those markets. Se Maynard, supra note 4, at 866-67; Norman S. Poser, Restuduting the Stock Markets: A Ctitical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L
REV. 883, 889 (1981); Nicholas Wolfson et al., The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16 HoW.
LJ. 791, 812-14 (1971).
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press cause of action, particularly the privity requirement, compensate for the liberal interpretation of this element.
D.

Definition of "Seller: The Privity Requirement of Section 12(2)

The plaintiff-buyer must show that the defendant-seller offered
or sold the securities at issue to the plaintiff. This built-in privity
requirement, an essential component of the section 12 cause of
action, was the source of considerable controversy among the federal appellate courts' until 1988, when the United States Supreme Court decided Pinter v. DahL' In construing the definition
of "seller" for purposes of section 12(1)' liability, the Court held
that the plaintiff must show that the defendant's activity was "motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."' Under this formulation,
prospective defendants in a section 12(1) suit include not only the
person who passes title or otherwise transfers an interest in the
security for value, but also certain persons who solicit prospective
buyers." A defendant's indirect involvement in the selling process, however, should not give rise to section 12(1) liability since
generally it will not meet the Pinterformulation.'
Limiting its analysis to section 12(1), the Pinter Court expressly declined to rule on the standard to be used for section 12(2)
purposes.' However, the Court discussed cases that primarily address section 12(2) issues. 0 Moreover, the relevant language of

63 See generally Douglas E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the SecuTities Act of 1933: "Participation"and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAM URB. UJ.
877-79 (1987) (describing different approaches used by courts); O'Hara, supra note 35, at
947; Leonard A. Silverstein, Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933: A Proximate Cause-SubstantialFactorApproach Limited by a Duty of Inquiby, 36 VAND.
L. REV. 361 (1983).
64 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
65 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988).
66 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 647.
67 As the Court observed:
The solicitation of a buyer is perhaps the most critical stage of the selling
transaction ....
In addition, brokers and other solicitors are well positioned
to control the flow of information to a potential purchaser, and, in fact, such
persons are the participants in the selling transaction who most often disseminate material information to investors.
Id. at 646.
68 See 1 THOMAS L HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 322 (2d ed. 1990).
69 Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642 n.20. See also William 0. Fisher, Parsing Pinter Four Years
Later. Defining a Statutory Seller Under Section 12 of the Securities Act, 21 SEC. REG. Lj. 46
(1993).
70 See, eg., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); Anderson
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both subsections is substantially identical, suggesting that the same
definition of "seller" should apply to both. Indeed, many courts
have since ruled that the Pinter standard applies to section 12(2)
claims,7' and the commentators generally agree that the Pinter
formulation of "seller" applies to section 12(2) as well. 2

v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1985); Foster v. Jessup and Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d
838 (l1th Cir. 1985); Davis v. AVCO Fin. Serv., 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1980); Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.
1979); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971);
Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943); Cady v. Murphy, 113
F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 '(1940).
71 Ryder Int'l Corp. v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1991); Cortec
Indus. v. SUM Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1561
(1992); Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991); Moore v. Kayport Package
Express, 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989); Decker v. Kraftsow (In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig.),
890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989); Royal Am. Managers v. IRC Holding Corp., 885'F.2d 1011
(2d Cir. 1989); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant was not seller under section 12(2) under substantial factor test or under
Pinter but not deciding whether or not Pinter applies to § 12(2) claims); Wilson v.
Saintine Exploration and Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989); Crawford v.
Glenns, Inc., 876 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1989); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473, 478 (2d Cir.
1988); Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1113-15 (5th Cir. 1988); PompanoWindy City Partners v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Scholes v.
Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 786 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. I1. 1992); Davis v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 787 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Ill. 1992); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F.
Supp. 275 (D.D.C. 1991); In re Sahlen & Assoc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Fla.
1991); Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Borey, 127 B.R. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Dawe v. Main
Street Management Co., 738 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1990); Sllin v. Rx Plus, Inc, 730 F.
Supp 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Epstein v. Haas Sec. Corp., 731 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Dalton v. Alston & Bird, 741
F. Supp. 1322 (S.D. 11. 1990); VT Investors v. R & D Funding Corp., 733 F. Supp. 823
(D.N.J. 1990); Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1990); Craig v.
First Am. Capital Resources, 740 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. I1. 1990); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co.,
720 F. Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1989); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 1140
(N.D. Cal. 1989);. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Properties, 740 F. Supp. 1553 (W.D. Okla. 1989);
Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 713 F. Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mich. 1989);
Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Laven v. Flanagan, 695
F. Supp. 800 (D.N.J. 1988); In re Professional Fin. Management, 692 F. Supp 1057 (D.
Minn. 1988); Jackson v. First Fed. Say. of Ark., F.A., 709 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Ark. 1988);
Scotch v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. Pa.
1988); Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, 704 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1988); Flournoy v.
Peyson, 701 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. 11. 1988).
72 See generaly Fisher, supra note 69, at 48 ("[V]irtualy every subsequent 12(2) decision has applied Pinters definition in addressing a statutory seller issue ....
").
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In the course of a distribution transaction, the issuer,7 3 as
the transferor of title, may be subject to section 12(2) liability
under the Pinter analysis.74 However, the Pinter analysis suggests
that other participants in the distribution effort may be subject to
section 12(2) liability as well. 5 Apart from the issuer, the most
important group of prospective section 12(2) defendants in a
distribution transaction is the individuals, generally broker-dealers,
who act on behalf of the sellers to recruit buyers to the offering.
Similarly, in a post-distribution trading transaction, the most
important, readily-identifiable group of prospective section 12(2)
defendants is broker-dealers, whose involvement as "sellers" in
secondary market transactions may arise in several ways. In a broker
capacity, a broker-dealer may act as an agent of the seller in the
execution of a customer's sell order.7 6 When acting in this brokerage capacity, the broker-dealer represents the interests of the
actual transferors of tide to the securities that are the subject of
that particular trading transaction, and generally receives a commission for such services. Thus, the broker-dealer falls within the
Pinter formulation of the privity requirement as one who was "motivated at least in part [if not exclusively] by a desire to serve his
own financial interests or those of the securities owner."" The
actual owner of such securities, who may be a Control Person
Seller or an Ordinary Seller, will also generally be a potential
section 12 (2) defendant.

73 This Article is not concerned with defining the standard to be used in determining the issuer's exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2). See infra note 154 and
accompanying text.
74 Generally, whether or not the issuer in a distribution transaction can be held
liable under section 12(2) depends upon the nature of the underwriting. If the underwriting is a "firm commitment" underwriting, the issuer transfers title to the securities to
the underwriter who in turn, sells the securities to the ultimate purchasers. In that case,
the buyer usually will be found to lack privity with the issuer and therefore cannot maintain a section 12(2) claim against the issuer. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, § 14.05, at 1426 to 14-27; LOss, supra note 3, at 1023-24. In a "best-efforts" underwriting, however, the
underwriter usually acts as the issuer's agent. The issuer passes title to the securities directly to the buyer, paying a commission to the underwriter on the sale. In that case,
the buyer usually is in privity with the issuer and therefore can maintain a section 12(2)
cause of action against the issuer. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, § 14.05, at 14-27; LoSS,
supra note 3, at 1024.
75 The post-Pinter commentary suggests, however, that many of these collateral participants do not qualify as "sellers" under the Pinter formulation. See HAZEN, supra note
68, at 322.
76 See 17A J. WiLLLAM HicKs, CWiL ITABIxrInEs: ENFORCEMENT & LITIGATION UNDER
THE 1933 AcT 6-122 to -123 (1989).
77 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988).
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On the other hand, a broker-dealer may act in a dealer capacity, selling securities as a principal to a buyer in a secondary market transaction. In such cases, the dealer is the actual owner,
transferring title to the securities in question to a buyer who often
has been solicited by the dealer.' In executing such trades, the
dealer often acts in an agency capacity as well since the buyer is
often a customer of the broker-dealer, further complicating the
scope of this seller's obligations to the prospective buyer.79
In Ballay, the court faced a transaction in which the brokerdealer firm appears to have acted in a dealer capacity. The Legg
Mason firm sold Wickes securities to buyers that it had recruited
largely through the dissemination of its materially misleading research reports. As such, it did not appear to act on behalf of any
named sellers. Instead, Legg Mason, presumably acting in a dealer
capacity, sold Wickes securities directly to the plaintiffs as a principal. This selling activity was still well within the scope of the Pinter
analysis since the trades Legg Mason executed for its customers
were motivated in substantial measure by a desire to further its
own financial interests, in the form of a mark-up, representing the
firm's profit on its sale as a dealer to the plaintiff-buyer. Section
12(2) liability seems well-predicated in situations such as this one
because the seller (Legg Mason) is alleged to have recruited these
investors (clients of the firm) through misleading communications,
which are prohibited by the very terms of section 12(2). Moreover,
the customers of Legg Mason appear to be the archetype of prospective investors-tured-purchasers that Congress intended to
protect by the enactment of the 1933 Act. °

78 Id.
79 See jENiNGs, supra note 6, at 646-48; Loss, supra note 3, at 821-29; Quincy Coop.
Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 655 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1986). The Quincy case involved
a secondary market transaction in which the broker-dealer firm (Edwards) sold mortgage
bonds that were trading in the secondary bond market to the buyer, a bank. As such,
the court found that Edwards was "a 'seller' for purposes of section 12(2), despite
Edwards' contention that it acted merely as the Bank's [buyer's] broker." Id. at 82. In an
early case, the First Circuit concluded that a broker who acted as an agent for the seller,
or as an agent for both buyer and seller, could be liable as a seller under section 12(2).
Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940). See also infra
notes 246-54 and accompanying text.
80 In enacting the 1933 Act, Congress had a dual purpose in mind: first, "to provide
investors with material financial and other information concerning the issues of securities
offered for sale to the public, and [secondly] to prohibit fraudulent sales of securities."
SeeJENNINGS, supra note 6, at 103. Congress' preoccupation under the 1933 Act with buyens of securities has previously been noted. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
There is some disagreement over whether Congress' concerns about securities fraud, as
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On the other hand, the Legg Mason firm could have been
acting as an agent for the actual seller of the Wickes securities,
who could be either a Control Person Seller or an Ordinary Seller. In either case, the broker-dealer who assists the actual owner
of the security generally would be treated as a seller under the
Pinter analysis because her activities on behalf of the actual owner
are motivated by the desire to receive financial renumeration,
usually in the form of a sales commission, rather than a mark-up.
In such situations, however, the actual owner, whether a Control
Person Seller or an Ordinary Seller,"' is also treated as a prospec-

manifested in the 1933 Act's anti-fraud provisions, extended beyond the buyer of securities. Some commentators believe that Congress' protections against fraud were motivated
only by concerns for defrauded buyers. See, e.g., Loss, A Rebutta supra note 8, at 56-57;
Weiss, supra note 8, at 30.
81 As to trading transactions involving Control Person Sellers or Ordinary Sellers as
the actual owners of the underlying securities, these sellers must also establish the basis
for an exemption from the section 5 registration obligation of the 1933 Act. See Loss, A
Rebuttal, supra note 8, at 48-49. Generally, the relevant exemption will be section 4(1). In
the case of Ordinary Sellers, this exemption should be readily established. Id. See also
JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 110-11, although there may be some issue as to the availability
of this exemption in situations where the Ordinary Seller attempts to resell restricted
stock. See infra notes 162-64.
Similarly, the control person generally will rely on the section 4(1) exemption so
long as the quantity sold does not rise to the level of a "distribution," thereby triggering
a section 5 registration obligation. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969); JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 486-89. Where the
control person effects resales of "controlled securities" in the secondary markets, the
scope of the control person's resale activity will always be subject to a different analysis
under section 12(2)'s requirement of the exercise of reasonable care, a conclusion that is
reinforced by examining the availability of the "section 4(1I)" styled exemption for the
control person's private resales of control securities. See infra notes 202-11 and accompanying text, discussing the basis for a section 4(11h) exemption for control persons' resale
activity and the implications thereof for the section 12(2) affirmative defense as to such
sellers.
Finally, where either of these secondary market sellers relies on the services of a
broker-dealer to execute their sell orders, or alternatively, where the broker-dealer is
herself the holder of the securities to be sold to the buyer, the broker-dealer must establish an exemption from the section 5 registration obligation for her involvement in this
trading activity. Generally speaking, the section 4(3) exemption, known as the "dealer's
exemption," is available since the broker-dealer's regular trading activities do not constitute a "distribution" and, therefore, do not rob this securities professional of her registration exemption by triggering a statutory underwriter analysis under section 2(11) of the
1933 Act. See generaly, JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 459-62, 480-83, 487-91. Where the broker-dealer facilitates the Ordinary Seller's disposition of restricted securities in a secondary
market transaction, or alternatively, where the broker-dealer facilitates the trading activities of a Control Person Seller in the secondary markets, additional concerns about the
availability of the section 4(3) exemption are raised that are addressed today primarily
through the requirements of Rule 144. Id. None of these exemptions from registration,
however, absolve any of these secondary market sellers of fraud liability under section 12(2).
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five section 12(2) defendant under the Pinter definition of "seller."
Where the plaintiff-purchaser brings suit against the transferor
of title (whether a Control Person Seller or an Ordinary Seller)
and the broker-dealer who recruited the investor to purchase the
securities, each section 12(2) defendant must establish her affirmative defense of the exercise of reasonable care. In the case of
multiple persons who satisfy the Pinter analysis, the defendant's
exercise of reasonable care will depend in substantial measure on
both the nature of the defendant-seller (i.e., Control Person Seller,
Ordinary Seller, or Broker-Dealer Seller) and the nature of the
material misstatement or omission communicated to the buyer,
which is the topic taken up in the next subpart.
E.

"Material"Misstatement or Omission

The defendant-seller must have engaged in fraudulent conduct "by means of a prospectus or oral communication" to be
held liable under section 12(2). Therefore, any materially misleading oral communication gives rise to liability under section
12(2).2 Additionally, the seller's use of a materially misleading

"prospectus" may also create liability under section 12(2). Analysis
of the term "prospectus" as used in section 12(2), however, is
complex.
Under section 2(10) of the 1933 Act, a "prospectus" is "any
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written
or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security. " ' Congress defined this term very
broadly to capture almost any written communication that "offers"
a security for sale, no matter what form it takes.' As envisioned
by Congress, the section 2(10) "prospectus" definition obviously includes the traditional offering circular prepared in connection
with registered distribution transactions, as well as other, perhaps
more unusual, writings that market participants-in both the distribution and the trading markets-may disseminate to solicit investor interest, such as research reports, letters, or sales brochures.'
82 The Seventh Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of the term
"oral communication" in favor of focusing on the substance of the message to be communicated, not the form by which the message is to be communicated. See Pacific
Dunlop
12.
83
84
85

Holdings v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 588 (7th Cir. 1993); Maynard, supra note
&e Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988).
See Loss, supra note 3, at 119.
See, eg Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 873 (2d Cir. 1971) (in which
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For example, in Ballay, Legg Mason, the defendant-seller,
disseminated false and misleading information both orally 8 and
through the distribution of research reports prepared by the firm's
research department, which presumably fell within the statute's
definition of "prospectus." Legg Mason representatives used the
research reports generated by its securities analysts to induce Legg
Mason customers to purchase Wickes securities. As such, the customers relied on these reports and Legg Mason received a benefit
from this reliance in the form of the commissions paid as a result
of its customers' purchases of Wickes securities in secondary market transactions executed by Legg Mason on its customers' behalf."7 In these situations, section 12(2) obligates the secondary
market seller, here, the Legg Mason firm, to make truthful statements in its research reports used in connection with the firm's
efforts to dispose of Wickes securities in the post-distribution trading markets.as
Thus, at a minimum, section 12(2) obligates the seller to fully
disclose any material facts necessary to make statements made by
the seller during the course of the trading transaction not misleading. In Ballay, the curative research reports (containing the firm's
accurate calculation of the book value of Wickes' securities) are
consistent with this understanding of the burdens imposed on
Legg Mason under section 12(2) since the curative research reports were necessary in order to make the firm's prior incorrect
statements of book value not misleading.'

the issuer sent a letter along with the prospectus/traditional offering circular to prospective investors, apparently in an effort to pique their interest; the court found that the
letter constituted a "prospectus"). See also Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities At Secion
12(2), 105 HARV. L. REv. 908, 916-17 (1992).
86 On at least one occasion, misleading oral communications regarding Wickes securities were made over the firm's "squawk box," thereby disseminating Legg Mason's misleading calculation of the book value of Wickes securities, excluding good will. See Ballay
v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1991).
87 On the other hand, if it turns out that in reporting the transaction to its customer, Legg Mason indicated that it had acted in a dealer capacity, then the financial benefit flowing to Legg Mason on this transaction generally would be referred to as a markup.
88 In Balay, the defendant-seller, a securities broker-dealer made affirmative misstatements about a material fact, i.e., the value of the underlying security. In such cases, section 12(2) is clear on its face in its prohibition of such affirmative misrepresentations. As
to omissions, on the other hand, the analysis is less clear. At the outset, it seems clear
that the defendant-seller inherits an obligation akin to the doctrine of half-truths at common law. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4200-01; HAMILTON, supra note 4, at
933-34.
89 The question arises, however, as to the scope of Legg Mason's disclosure obliga-
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In addition to a misleading oral or written communication,
the purchaser also must show that the seller misrepresented or
omitted a "material fact" in her prospectus or oral communication.
The modem test for determining materiality is whether "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider
it important in deciding" whether to purchase the security.' This
test is widely used under the federal securities laws"' and includes
reference to whether the "fact" involves "soft information," such as
estimates of revenues, earnings per share, future value, and other
types of forward-looking information not readily susceptible to
precise calculation. 2

tion to its customers if it had not disseminated the materially misleading research reports. In other words, does section 12(2) by itself impose an affirmative obligation on
the part of the seller to disclose material facts to the buyer? It seems as though "section
12(2) does not impose liability for omissions per se--although here again the Section
presumably goes at least as far as the common law in imposing an affirmative duty to
speak in special situations, as when the seller occupies a fiduciary relationship to the buy,
er. .. ." 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4201-02. See also Pacific Dunlop Holdings
v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 587 (7th Cir 1992), wherein the Seventh Circuit suggested
that section 12(2) applies to a particular subset of fraud-that committed by way of
fraudulent prospectus or oral communication.
Although section 12(2) in and of itself does not appear to be the source of an
affirmative disclosure obligation, it is likewise clear that the section 12(2) defendant-seller
cannot ignore the circumstances surrounding her sale to the buyer, including her relationship to the buyer, in deciding whether the seller must make disclosure in order to
avoid section 12(2) liability for making misleading communications to the buyer. Assuming, therefore, that Legg Mason is in possession of information that is material to its
customers' proposed trading.transactions, the scope of its affirmative disclosure obligation
to its customers under section 12(2) must of necessity depend in substantial part on the
nature of this defendant-seller and her relationship to the plaintiff-buyer, factors that are
also crucial to defining the scope of the seller's burden to establish her exercise of reasonable care. See injra Part IV. Thus, analysis of the seller's disclosure obligation under
section 12(2) is interwoven with the analysis of the seller's standard of reasonable care,
and cannot be fully examined without evaluating the criteria that define the seller's exercise of reasonable care. The scope of this disclosure obligation is more fully addressed in
section IV of this Article, which sets forth the framework for analyzing the exercise of
reasonable care as to each respective class of potential section 12(2) defendant-seller, and
incorporates relevant common law doctrines-including fiduciary duty principles-in refining this analysis.
90 TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
91 Although the Court originally formulated this definition in the context of a Rule
14a-9 implied cause of action for violations of the SEC's proxy solicitation rules, courts
generally have followed it in interpreting the concepts of "materiality" under other provisions of the federal securities laws. See Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560
F.2d 916, 919-20 (8th Cir. 1977) (applying the TSC standard of materiality to a section
12(2) suit); Loss, supra note 3, at 550-55.
92 See JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 204-06; 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4200;
17A HicKs, supra note 76, at 6-255 to -256.
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In Ballay, the material fact related to the book value of
Wickes securities. The research department of the Broker-Dealer
Seller published a report, including its analysis of the book value
of Wickes securities. This analysis led the firm to recommend the
security to its customers as an undervalued security. Relying on
the integrity of this advice, many buyers entered the secondary
market to purchase Wickes securities. The materiality of this book
value calculation, and the firm's recommendations based on it,
were undoubtedly important to the buyers' investment decisions,
and therefore material.'
The nature of the "fact" misrepresented in Ballay related to
the nature of the issuer or its business and thus is one that affected the intrinsic value of the company's securities.' However,
the nature of statements (or of misleading omissions) made by
defendant-sellers can vary widely and may relate to almost any
aspect of the underlying trading transaction. Such variations may
range from the amount of commission that the plaintiff-purchaser
will pay the defendant-seller to the value of the securities that the
plaintiff-buyer will purchase. Analytically, the nature of the statements made (or facts omitted) can be broadly categorized as follows: 95
.

ii.

the nature of the issuer's business or operations,
or other factors affecting the intrinsic value of
the security;
the customer's investment objectives and/or needs;e

93 The broker-dealer's book value calculation also involves the question of whether it
was properly prepared. This aspect of establishing the defendant-seller's liability under
section 12(2) is addressed in the context of analyzing the seller's affirmative defense of
reasonable care. See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
94 Representations about the nature of the issuer or the value of its securities clearly
raise an issue as to the scope of the seller's obligation to make an affirmative investigation of the facts that form the basis for such representations and, as such, is properly
analyzed as part of the seller's defense of reasonable care. However, not all types of
material misrepresentations or omissions trigger an analysis of whether the section 12(2)
defendant-seller must undertake an investigation in order to ascertain the completeness
and/or truthfulness of the misrepresented or omitted facts. See infra notes 97-101 and
accompanying text.
95 In developing this analytical framework, the author is indebted to Prof. Lipton's
excellent treatise, 15 DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEATER REGULATION (1989), and to the
authoritative treatise, NICHOLAS WOLFSON Er AL, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND
SECURrTIEs MARKETS (1977).
96 This type of fraudulent statement necessarily involves discussion of the shingle
theory and the suitability doctrine and, therefore, most particularly relates to the prospective liability of broker-dealers as seller-defendants under section 12(2). See infra notes 227-
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iii.

iv.

the terms of either the proposed securities transaction or the instrument itself (i.e. commission
charges or other aspects of brokerage compensation, or the yield on a debt instrument, etc.);
and
the nature of the seller or other participants in
the offering (i.e. the broker-dealer's status as a
market-maker, etc.).

As to statements falling within the first two categories, a further issue arises as to whether the defendant-seller incurs a duty to
investigate the facts in order to ensure the accuracy and completeness of any statements made by the seller. For example, the nature of the statements made in Ballay regarding the book value of
Wickes securities falls within category (i). Assuming that as part of
its recommendation of Wickes securities, Legg Mason made a
completely truthful disclosure to the prospective buyers of all material facts known to it, the critical issue then becomes whether
Legg Mason, as the defendant-seller, had an affirmative duty to
investigate to ascertain all relevant facts (and the accuracy thereof)
that impact the basis of its recommendation, including its estimate
of the book value of the securities. However, the analysis of the
scope of Legg Mason's obligation, if any, to conduct a reasonable
investigation properly falls within the analysis of the seller's burden to show that she exercised reasonable care. 97
On the other hand, statements falling within categories (iii)
and (iv) do not generally, in and of themselves, trigger an inquiry
into whether the defendant-seller has satisfied an obligation to
conduct a reasonable investigation. Instead, the analysis of these
types of statements properly focuses on whether there has been
full and adequate disclosure of all material facts. For example, in
a transaction involving the sale of a debt instrument, the prospective buyer may demand to know the effective yield. Section 12(2)

39 and accompanying text.
97 Similarly, statements falling within category (ii) trigger an analysis of whether the
defendant-seller incurs a duty to make a reasonable investigation before recommending a
particular security for purchase by an investor. In order to recommend particular securities to a particular customer, the broker-dealer must ascertain the customer's investment
objectives, financial resources, etc. Obtaining this information necessarily entails an investigation of the customer's situation. This application of the suitability doctrine is properly
taken up in analyzing the nature of the defendant-seller and her obligation to exercise
reasonable care in order to establish her affirmative defense. See infra notes 241-43 and
accompanying text.
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would forbid the Broker-Dealer Seller from misleading the buyer
as to the stated yield. Thus, the broker-dealer may be required to
familiarize herself with the terms of the debt instrument at issue
to ensure that her statements will meet the full disclosure obligation of section 12(2) by providing the buyer with all the information necessary to make the seller's statements to the buyer not
misleading. In familiarizing herself with the instrument so as to be
in a position to make full and accurate disclosure to the prospective buyer, the seller presumably need not undertake any independent investigation beyond a careful reading of both the terms of
the instrument and any related offering materials. As this analysis
of statements falling into category (iii) demonstrates, the exercise
of reasonable care under section 12(2) imposes, at a minimum, an
obligation of full candor,s requiring the seller to be completely
truthful, but does not necessarily trigger as a threshold matter any
obligation to make a reasonable investigation.
Similarly, statements falling within category (iv) relating to the
nature of the seller-for example, a Broker-Dealer Seller's representations about her status as a market-maker in the underlying
security9--do not, in and of themselves, trigger an affirmative obligation to make an investigation of any underlying facts in order
for the Broker-Dealer Seller to be in a position to make full and
adequate disclosure of all material facts about her market-maker

98 17A HiCs, supra note 76, at 6-252, -303 to -304.
99 In Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642 (D. Mass. 1985), the
plaintiff was a customer that maintained an account with Dean Witter, a broker-dealer.
The plaintiff purchased stock pursuant to the recommendation of a Dean Wtter agent.
Both the agent and Dean Witter owned stock in the company in which the agent recommended that his customer invest. The agent did not disclose either his own or Dean
Witter's holdings in the company. The agent apparently executed the transaction as a
broker. After. the customer lost $250,000 on the investment, he brought a section 12(2)
claim against Dean Witter. In determining whether or not there had been a material
misrepresentation or omission, the court focussed on the agent's failure to disclose his
own holdings in the stocks. The court also observed: "It would certainly have been material if Dean Witter was making a market in the securities, acting in the transactions as
a principal rather than simply as an agent for Prawer." Id. at 644.
In Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), the plaintiff
brought a Rule 10b-5 action against Smith, Barney, a broker-dealer. A Smith, Barney
agent had recommended that the plaintiff invest in a stock in which Smith, Barney made
a market. The agent, however, did not disclose to the plaintiff that Smith, Barney was a
market-maker for the stock in question. The plaintiff accepted the agent's recommendation and purchased the stock, unaware that Smith, Barney was dealing as a principal in
the transaction. The court held that "[i]n this situation failure to inform the customer
fully of its possible conflict of interest, in that it was a market maker in the securities
which it strongly recommended for purchase by him, was an omission of material fact in
violation of Rule 10b-5 ... ." Id. at 1172.

-
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status. As such, litigated cases involving broker-dealers' statements
that fall into categories (iii) and (iv) generally raise threshold
issues of whether the defendant-seller made full and adequate disclosure of all material facts in her communications with the buyer."° Fulfillment of this disclosure obligation is distinct from the
defendant-seller's duty to exercise "reasonable care," however,
including any subsidiary obligation to make an affirmative investigation to put the seller in possession of all material facts. As such,
statements that fall into categories (iii) and (iv) do not, in and of
themselves, impose the same threshold question of whether the
seller is required at the outset to undertake a reasonable investigation in order to establish the seller's section 12(2) defense of
reasonable care, unlike the statements that fall within categories
(i) and (ii).
As to future cases involving material misrepresentations or
omissions not falling within the above four-part classification of
statements, any such future alleged misstatement or omission presumably would be classifiable as to whether a reasonable investigation would be required at the outset (thus akin to the analysis of
statements falling within categories (i) and (ii)). Alternatively, the
misstatement or omission would be classifiable as a statement requiring the seller to satisfy an obligation of full candor, thereby
triggering a duty to make full and adequate disclosure of all facts
known to the seller (similar to the threshold analysis required by
statements falling within categories (iii) and (iv)).
F.

PlaintiffBuyer's Knowledge of Misrepresentationor Omission

The only duty that section 12(2) imposes on the plaintiff as
part of his case-in-chief is to show 0 2 that, at the time of sale, he

100 Or, alternatively, whether the disputed "fact" was "material" and thus subject to
the disclosure requirements of section 12(2).
101 A particular fact pattern may involve facts and circumstances that give rise to a
claim of constructive notice to the defendant-seller, which may create an obligation to
conduct a reasonable investigation in order to resolve any underlying concerns that are
raised as a result of notice to the seller of these suspicious circumstances. The analysis of
whether the section 12(2) defendant-seller must make such an investigation to preserve
her section 12(2) affirmative defense, or alternatively, whether the seller may satisfy her
section 12(2) obligation of exercise of reasonable care through full diselbsure of a!/facts
to the buyer-including disclosure of any suspicious facts and circumstances that give rise
to the constructive notice to the seller-should depend on the nature of the seller and
the flexible analysis of reasonable care described in Part IV of this Article.
102 See 17A HICKS, supra note 76, at 6-257 to -258 ('Thus, a court will deny recovery
unless a section 12(2) plaintiff can prove that he did not know of the alleged omission
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did not know of the alleged misrepresentations or omissions."03
The section 12(2) cause of action, however, places no duty of
investigation on the purchaser; 4 the duty to investigate, if any,
falls exclusively on the seller."°5
Furthermore, the buyer need not establish any reliance on the
seller's misstatement or omission.tu6 The courts and commentators have consistently rejected defendants' attempts to introduce
some type of causation requirement into plaintiffs' case-inchief.07 Thus, once the plaintiff-buyer demonstrates his igno-

or misrepresentation at the time of sale.").
103 See Mayer v. Oil Field Sys. Corp., 611 F. Supp. 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), afj'd, 803
F.2d 749, 755-56 (2d Cir. 1986); Kaminsky, supra note 49, at 266; Theresa A. Gabaldon,
Causation, Courts, and Congress: A Study of Contradiction in the Federal Securities Laws, 31 B.C.
L. REV. 1027, 1056-60 (1990).
104 Mayer v. Oil Field Sys., 803 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1986); Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609
F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1979); Alton Box Board Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d
916 (8th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 696 (5th
Cir. 1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1970); Johns Hopkins Univ.
v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1970); Barnebey v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 715
F. Supp. 1512, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1989). At least one commentator has observed that
'where the misrepresentation or omission is contained in a writing and relates to a widely held security, purchasers apparently need not even demonstrate their receipt of the
misleading writing." Gabaldon, supra note 103, at 1057 (citing to Sanders v. John Nuveen
& Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981)). A
different result may obtain, however, where the security is not widely held. See Gabaldon,
supra note 103, at 1058 n.161.
105 The seller's duty to investigate generally will arise as part of the seller's burden
to establish that she acted with reasonable care and therefore may properly claim the
statute's affirmative defense. See 17A HicKs, supra note 76, at 6-260 to -261.
106 MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Shearson/American Express, 886 F.2d
1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 1989) (Section 12(2) "has no requirement of justifiable reliance on
the part of a purchaser."); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959);
Aronson v. TPO Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 17A HiCs, supra note 76,
at 6-202 to -205.
107 In vigorously resisting one defendant's attempt to impose a causation requirement
on the plaintiff the Fourth Circuit reasoned: "[Defendant]'s theory of 'causation' is an
impermissible attempt to introduce reliance upon the misrepresentations and omissions as
a necessary element of section 12(2)." Johns Hopkins Univ., 422 F.2d at 1129. A similar
ploy was summarily rejected in Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1968),
where the seller sought to defend on the ground that "the sale was not 'by means'
of. . . [an offering] circular." Several commentators, as well as the courts, have struggled to give meaning to the statutory reference that the underlying sale be "by means
of" a materially misleading statement without using this language to impose on the plaintiff some form of strict reliance requirement. One commentator has suggested that a fair
reading of the statute's language indicates that "there must be some causal connection
between the challenged communication and the plaintiff's purchase" but that this interpretation does not lead to the requirement "that the misleading communication be instrumental in effecting the sale." Kirk J. Goza, Comment, Securities Regulation: Reliance as
an Element in a Section 12(2) Action, 30 KAN. L. REv. 599, 608 (1982) (citing to Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); and Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d
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rance of the material facts as of the time of his purchase, the burden shifts to the defendant-seller to establish her exercise of reasonable care in connection with the sale to that plaintiff-buyer.
G.

Duty Analysis Under Section 12(2): The Affirmative Defense of
"Reasonable Care"

This Article has demonstrated that where a misrepresentation
or omission of a material fact is made orally or in a prospectus
and the plaintiff-buyer did not know the truth, the defendant-seller
in privity with such a buyer (as determined by the Pinter analysis)
will be liable under section 12(2) for rescission or rescissory damages."t° The only -affirmative defense available to the defendantseller requires the seller to prove not only that she did not know
about the untruths or omissions, but also that she could not have
learned the truth by the exercise of reasonable care."

826 (2d Cir. 1976)).
108 With respect to the manner of computing plaintiffs damages, the Supreme
Court's decision in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 655-60 (1986), makes clear that
the Court takes a broad view of the remedial purposes underlying this express cause of
action. In rejecting the defendants' claim that the amount recoverable under section 12(2) should be limited by any tax benefits that the buyer received from ownership
of the security, the Court observed that, in enacting the 1933 Act, Congress had broader
goals than the reimbursement of particular victims. Id. Therefore, it is proper that the
section 12(2) seller bear "the risk of an intervening decline in the value of the security . . . whether or not that decline was actually caused by the fraud." Id. at 659. "The
Court noted that Congress devised this risk to create an additional measure of deterrence
as compared to a purely compensatory measure of damages." Gabaldon, supr note 103,
at 1058. However, the measure of damages does not lead to potentially draconian recoveries. Where the elements of section 12(2) are established, "it is the recission measure,
along with the modified privity requirement, that brings such liability within reasonable
limits. The fact that loss causation is never permitted to be raised as an issue makes it
even clearer than in the case of section 11 that the cause of action is not primarily
compensatory ....
[D]eterrence is the logical, and acknowledged, congressional
goal . . . " Id.at 1059-60 (footnotes omitted).
109 In addition to the section 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care, a short
statute of limitations applies to section 12(2) actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992); 17A HicKs, supra note 76 at 6-274 to -293. The seller may also defend against
liability by refuting the plaintiff's required showing on any of the elements of his section
12(2) action. For example, the seller may try to establish that the purchaser actually
knew the misrepresented or omitted facts, or that the facts were not "material." 17A Id.
§ 6.07. Additionally, the defendant-seller could attack certain jurisdictional prerequisites,
such as whether the instrument purchased was a "security" or whether the facilities of
interstate commerce or the mails were used as part of the transaction at issue. 17A Id.
§ 6.04. Other defenses may be available to the seller as well, including waiver and estoppel. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 628 n.8 (1988); Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp.
829, 841 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
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Congress, therefore, did not require the buyer to establish the
seller's intent. Instead, in a modified form of a negligence
standard, Congress left it to the seller to show that she acted with
the appropriate level of care considering all the circumstances surrounding the underlying sale."' Accordingly, Congress did not
purport to define specifically the level of care required in any
given sale; presumably, the level of care required would depend
on a variety of factors including the manner of sale, the nature of
the relevant security, the nature of the defendant-seller, etc."' By
requiring pr6of of the exercise of the requisite level of care as the
seller's affirmative defense, Congress recognized that most of the
facts relevant to proof of the seller's intent, such as the defendantseller's knowledge of the untruth as well as her access to truthful
information relating to the proposed sale of securities, are largely
within the control of the defendant-seller. Therefore, the seller's
satisfaction of this burden of proof under section 12(2) should be
less costly than if this burden were imposed on the plaintiff-buy2

er.1

Shifting this burden to the defendant-seller can also be viewed
as an attempt by Congress to bolster the level of care used by
sellers of securities in order to better protect the unsuspecting

110 See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1308-09 n.105 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
bane); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1262 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd, 599 F.2d
1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Epstein, supra note 5, at 387-92. This view of the standard required under section 12(2) has received support in the commentary on section 12(2). See 17A HICKS,
supra note 76, at 6-298; Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After
Naftalin and Redington, 68 GEo. LJ. 163, 178 (1979) ("the standard of liability in an
action brought under section 12(2) is negligence"). In formulating the Federal Securities
Code, the American Law Institute characterized the standard of section 12(2) as a "basic
negligence standard." ALI Federal Securities Code § 287b, at 144 n.5 (Proposed Official
Draft 1978). At least two commentators, however, have expressed the view that section 12(2) imposes a standard other than that of basic negligence. See Ernest L. Folk,
Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Ads: The BarChris Case (pt. 2), 55 VA. L. REV. 199,
207-14 (1969); Kaminsky, supra note 50, at 275-78. See also William 0. Douglas & George
E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE LJ. 171, 173-77 (1933) (comparing the
section 11 due diligence defense to section 12(2) reasonable care defense, noting that
both had purposes beyond being merely compensatory, but suggesting that section 12(2)'s standard "presumably is somewhat less exacting" than the requirement of
section 11).
111 See 17A HICKS, supra note 76, at 6-296 to -297.
112 Thus, this shift can be viewed as a purposeful effort by Congress to ease the
substantial burden of proof that was otherwise imposed on the buyer under the common
law corollary, a suit for fraud. Loss, supra note 3, at 1022. Congress justified this shift, in
substantial part, on the grounds that defendant-sellers generally are closer to the facts
necessary to establish their innocence. See 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4206-07.
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buyer from an unscrupulous seller of securities."' Delineation of
the standard of care as applied to any particular defendant-seller,
therefore, should take into account the deterrence component, as
well as the compensatory purpose, that underlies the express remedy of section 12(2). 114
In light of these policy factors, the fact that the defendantseller may have acted honestly and in good faith is irrelevant if,
with reasonable diligence, she could have discovered the truth."5
Therefore, the crucial issue is the scope of the seller's reasonable
diligence burden, including any obligation on the seller's part to
make a "reasonable investigation." The next Part examines the
limited body of judicial decisions that have addressed this aspect
of section 12(2).
III.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE SECTION 12(2)
REASONABLE CARE DEFENSE

The discussion in Part II briefly described the elements of a
section 12(2) cause of action in order to place the seller's affirmative defense into proper focus. This Part examines existing case
law interpretation of the seller's statutory defense and demonstrates that judicial decisions have relied on a flexible approach
which encompasses a number of different factors in applying 'the
statute's reasonable care requirement.
A:

The Leading Case: Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.

The leading case addressing the scope of the reasonable care
standard under section 12(2) is Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co."'
In this case, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the defendant underwriter was required to conduct a reasonable investigation in
order to establish its exercise of reasonable care. However, the
precise standard for determining the seller's exercise of reasonable

113 See Epstein, supra note 5, at 387-92.
114 See Gabaldon, supra note 103, at 1058-59.
115 The affirmative defense under section 12(2) therefore is comprised of two parts:
the seller had no actual knowledge of the true facts, and in the exercise of reasonable
care, the seller could not have known of the untruth. See 17A HiCs, supra note 76, at 6303.
116 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir.), ct denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981). This case was preceded by three cases of the same name, which the court referred to as Sanders , 11 and M//.
This Article will also refer to Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.
1975) as Sanders II, and Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) as
Sanders I/.
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care, including any requirement
that the seller make a reasonable
11 7
investigation, remains unclear.

The plaintiff-investor class in Sanders consisted of forty-two
purchasers of the unsecured promissory notes of Winter & Hirsch,
Inc. ("W & H"), a consumer finance company. This offering of W
& H notes was exempt from the registration and prospectus delivery obligations under the commercial paper exemption of section
3(a) (3). "' The defendant broker-dealer firm, John Nuveen

&

Co. ("Nuveen"), served as the exclusive underwriter of this public
offering of W & H notes,"9 which were sold through Nuveen's
branch offices in a manner similar to other commercial paper
offerings in which Nuveen participated.
In connection with this offering, Nuveen prepared a report
on the W & H notes. 2 ' The Nuveen salesmen distributed this
report to prospective purchasers of the W & H commercial paper' and made oral statements to some of the plaintiff class
members about the quality of W & H commercial paper. Moreover, the head of Nuveen's commercial paper department testified

117 See John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981) (denial of certiorari).
Justice Powell's opinion, dissenting from the Court's decision to deny review in Sanders,
reflects this uncertainty: "Although the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not explicit, it
appears to impose a duty of 'reasonable investigation' rather than section 12(2)'s requirement of 'reasonable care.'" Id. at 1008 (Powell, J., dissenting).
118 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(a)(3) (1988). This exemption
was intended to facilitate the sale of an issuer's short term promissory notes, i.e., commercial paper, the proceeds of which generally are used to provide cash to finance
issuer's current operations. See Sanders, 450 U.S. at 1006; BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, at
§ 4.04[6]; HAZEN, supra note 3, § 1.5, at 33, and § 4.4, at 130.
119 The transaction at issue in the Sanders case involved an exempt public offering'of
commercial paper. As such, this distribution transaction differs from the focus of this paper, which is on transactions in the seconday trading markets that may create liability
under section 12(2). Since Sanders is one of the leading cases regarding the scope of the
reasonable care defense under section 12(2), its discussion of the scope of the seller's
affirmative defense presents a useful starting point for analyzing the application of this
defense to the seller's activities in secondary market transactions. In the underwritten
offering of W & H commercial paper, Nuveen delivered to each of the plaintiff class
members the usual written confirmations describing the W & H notes purchased by the
plaintiffs from Nuveen, who had sold the notes as principal. Sanders, 524 F.2d at 1067. As
such, on these facts there was no dispute whether Nuveen was a seller within the privity
requirement of section 12(2). This result would be consistent with the Pinter formulation
of seller. See Sanders III, 554 F.2d at 790; Sanders II, 524 F.2d at 1064.
120 Sanders II, 524 F.2d at 1067.
121 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d at 1224. Three plaintiff class members
testified to receiving copies of this report prior to their purchases of W & H notes, while
at least two other class members testified to receiving Nuveen's commercial paper report,
although they could not swear they had received the report prior to making their purchases.
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that the firm sold commercial paper, including the W & H notes,
"on the basis 'that there should be no question but what the paper will be paid at maturity.'"' 2
Subsequently, W & H defaulted on its notes held by the plaintiff. As detailed by the Seventh Gircuit:
[W & H's] default was the product of a fraud it perpetrated with the connivance of the certified public
accountants who audited its financial statements and
rendered opinions thereon. In summary, over a period of ten years [W & H] continually issued financial
statements in which accounts receivable were overstated and some of its indebtedness was omitted. By 1970
[W & H's] financial statements overstated accounts
receivable by some $14,000,000 and failed to reflect
some $1,750,000 of indebtedness.'"
Accordingly, at the time these plaintiff-investors purchased the W
& H notes from Nuveen, W & H's liabilities exceeded its assets.

24

At the time of its participation in the public offering of W &
H commercial paper, Nuveen was not aware of the fraud. Rather,
it held "the mistaken but honest belief that [the W & H] financial
statements prepared by certified public -accountants correctly represented the condition of [W & H]." 1" Nuveen relied 6n these
false financial statements in the preparation of its commercial
paper report, which was then distributed to prospective buyers of
W & H notes.
Nuveen defended against section 12(2) liability2 6 primarily
on the grounds that it did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of W & H's fraud as reflected

122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Following its default, W & H wa. taken over by its creditors. Ultimately, W & H
was liquidated and the proceeds were distributed to creditors of W & H, including plaintiff class members who received back approximately two-thirds of the amounts they originally paid to Nuveen for the W & H notes. The plaintiff class members then sued
Nuveen to recover the unpaid balance bf the purchase price of the W & H notes and
prejudgment interest thereon. Id.
125 Sanders II, 524 F.2d at 1066.
126 The plaintiff also brought a Rule lOb-5 claim against Nuveen, which was denied
because of plaintiffs' failure to establish scienter on the part of Nuveen. See Sanders II,
554 F.2d at 790; Sanders I, 524 F.2d at 1064.
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on its financial statements. On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit denied Nuveen this affirmative defense because of its failure,
in its capacity as underwriter of W & H notes,'27 to conduct- an
investigation of the financial affairs of W & H, the issuer of the
commercial paper. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
Nuveen, as the underwriter, was required to undertake a reasonable investigation of the issuer and its business affairs in order to
establish its reasonable care defense under section 12(2). The
Seventh Circuit's conclusion is notable in several respects, particularly from the perspective of the defendant sued under section
12(2) as a seller in a secondary market transaction.
The Seventh Circuit readily concluded that the "exercise of
reasonable care" within the meaning of section 12(2) includes an
obligation, under certain circumstances, to undertake a reasonable
investigation of the facts underlying the statements the seller
makes to prospective buyers. Thus, the court found that Nuveen,
as seller, was under an obligation to make a reasonable investigation of the facts underlying the statements made in Nuveen's
commercial paper reports that were disseminated to its customers,
even though these matters may have been outside the scope of
Nuveen's direct control, relating as they did to the nature of the
issuer and its business and financial affairs. In imposing this burden on Nuveen to conduct a reasonable investigation of W & H
and its financial affairs, the court relied heavily on Nuveen's position as an underwriterof W & H's public offering of its notes. 8
The court's reliance on Nuveen's status as an underwriter of
W & H's public offering of commercial paper is not entirely misplaced because section 11" expressly imposes an investigation
obligation on underwriters of offerings that are registered under
° An underwriter of a registered offering is subject to
section 5 .is
127 This case involves a broker-dealer's participation as an underwriter in a distribution transaction and therefore does not squarely address the situation presented by the
participation of a broker-dealer in a secondary market transaction. Nonetheless, the Sanders case is instructive since it involves a broker-dealer's representations regarding the nature of the issuer, its business, and its securities. As such, it involves one of the types of
material statements that is more problematic to analyze for purposes of determining the
proper scope of "reasonable care" under section 12(2). See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text describing various classes of statements that may create liability under section 12(2).
128 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d at 1227.
129 Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
130 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 77 U.S.C. § 77e (1988); see also HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURrIEs LAW HANDBOOK 284-86 (1987-88 ed.) (discussion of the standard of care section 12(2) of the 1933 Act requires).

1993]

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF REASONABLE CARE

liability under section 11 for any misrepresentations or omissions
of material fact in the registration statement as of the date it becomes effective.'
Section 11(b), however, provides the underwriter with an affirmative defense, generally referred to as the
"due diligence defense." Under section 11(b), the underwriter
must show that it reasonably believed, and did believe, following a
reasonable investigation of the underlying facts and circumstances,
truthful and-accuthat the registration statement was completely
2
rate as of the date of its effectiveness.1
Section 11 was intended to bolster the overall degree of involvement of underwriters in the process of preparing the issuer's
However, as Nuveen pointed out, the
registration statement.'
statute distinguished between (i) those statements prepared by and
under the authority of an acknowledged expert, such as an accountant, geologist, or other professional (the "expertised portion"), and (ii) all other portions of the registration not prepared
by an expert (the "nonexpertised portion").
As to the nonexpertised portions of the registration statement,
the underwriter has an express obligation to conduct a reasonable
investigation"s and, based on this investigation, must demonstrate his or her reasonable belief in the veracity of the statements
made. With respect to the expertised portions, however, the statute
relaxes the showing required of the defendant by eliminating any
affirmative obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation. Rather, the underwriter defendant must show only that he or she "had
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe" that the
information contained in the expertised portion of the registration

131 See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988). Although Nuveen
acted as an underwriter, it was not subject to section 11 liability since the W & H offering was exempt from section 5 registration requirements by virtue of section 3(a)(3) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1988). ,
132 Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1988).
133 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 4, § 14.03, at 14-2 (describing in krnvrem purpose of
section 11); HAZEN, supra note 3, § 7.4, at 297 (discussing underwriter's potential conflict
of interest with issuer in public offering that generally results in an almost adversarial
type of relationship during the course of preparing the registration statement).
what con134 Section 11(c) defines "reasonable investigation": "In determining ...
stitutes reasonable investigation . . . , the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c)
(1988). The courts have interpreted this standard flexibly, looking to, among other
things, the nature of the different individual defendants and his or her relationship to
the process of preparing the registration statement. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Co., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris, 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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statement was false or misleading."k If the nonexpert defendant
is put on notice of facts that tend to show that some statement
made by the expert is not completely truthful, such notice presumably would trigger some obligation on the part of that nonexpert defendant to conduct a reasonable investigation in order to
establish the nonexpert's reasonable belief in the accuracy of the
expertised portion of the registration statement.
In Sanders, the defendant was not directly subject to section
11 standards because the public offering of W & H notes was
exempt and therefore did not involve the preparation of a registration statement. Reasoning by analogy, the Seventh Circuit found
that the same high degree of involvement of the underwriter as
required by section 11 in the case of a registered offering should
apply in the context of an unregistered, exempt public offering.1 3 6 In the process, however, the court failed to borrow fully
from the relaxed formulation of the section 11 due diligence
standards as to the expertised portions of a registration statement.
As Justice Powell forcefully pointed out in his dissent from the
Supreme Court's refusal to review the Seventh Circuit's decision:
Even under § 11 of the Act, an underwriter is explicitly absolved of the duty to investigate with respect to
"any part of the registration statement purporting to
be made on the authority of an expert" such as a
certified accountant if "he had no reasonable ground
to believe and did not believe" that the information
therein was misleading. This provision is in the Act
because, almost by definition, it is reasonable to rely
on financial statements certified by public accoun-

135 See Securities Act of 1933 § Il (b) (3) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (3) (c) (1988); see also
BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 685 (chief financial officer was not entitled to rely on the
accountant's statements as an "expert," because he was aware of facts that suggested that
the statements made by the expert in the company's financial statements were not completely truthful).
136 The Sanders court believed that Congress intended that the same duty of care
would apply to an underwriter under section 11 for a registered distribution and under
section 12(2) for an exempt distribution. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d at
1228. The difference in language between section l's duty of "reasonable investigation"
and section 12(2)'s duty of "reasonable care" is attributable to the broader class of defendants for which section 12(2) imposes liability, but that difference was not intended to
reduce the underwriter's standard of care for an exempt offering. Ld.Whether or not the
offering is registered or exempt, "a greater quantity of information is 'reasonably
ascertainable' by an underwriter than by a mere broker." Sanders, 619 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Sanders I, 524 F.2d at 1071).
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tants. Yet, in this case, the Court of Appeals nevertheless seems to have imposed the higher duty pre-

scribed by § 11 to investigate, but denied petitioner
the right to rely. on "the authority of an expert" that
also is provided by § 11."
Implicit in the Seventh Circuit's reasoning, therefore, is the
assumption that .the "reasonable care" standard of section 12(2)
may require that the defendant-seller undertake a reasonable investigation. As Justice Stevens pointed out, the language of section
12(2) is conspicuous in its omission of any express obligation to
make such an investigation, unlike the section 11 standard.lss
Thus, he raises the threshold question of whether the exercise of
reasonable care under section 12(2) requires, in the first instance,
any showing that the defendant-seller conducted a reasonable
investigation.
At the very least, Sanders demonstrates that in some situations
a section 12(2) defendant may be required to show that she conducted a reasonable investigation in order to establish that she has
exercised the requisite degree of care. Further, by recognizing the
nature of Nuveen's involvement as an underwriter in the sale of W
& H commercial paper to the plaintiff-buyers, the Court seems to
acknowledge that the nature of the defendant-seller, as well as the
nature of the defendant's involvement in the sale to the plaintiff,
is important in defining the relevant standard of reasonable care
required of that defendant-seller under section 12(2).19

137
138

Sanders, 450 U.S. at 1010 (footnotes and citations).
To quote Justice Stevens:
In providing standards of care under the 1933 Act, Congress thus used different language for different situations. "Reasonable investigation" is required for
registered offerings under § 11, but nothing more than "mer[e] . . . 'reasonable care'" is required by § 12(2) . . . . The difference in language is significant, because in the securities acts Congress has used its words with precision.
Id. at 1008-09.
139 The SEC likewise pointed to the nature of the, underwriting activities of defendant Nuveen and emphasized that Nuveen's involvement as an underwriter did not
change simply because the offering was exempt and therefore outside the scope of section 11 liability:
Since Congress has determined that registration is not necessary in certain
defined situations, we believe that it would undermine the Congressional intent-that issuers and other persons should be relieved of registration-if the
same degree of investigation were to be required to avoid potential liability
whether or not a registration statement is required.
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Sanders suggests that the reasonable care standard of section
12(2) should be interpreted flexibly and that the nature of the
defendant is a crucial factor in defining the relevant standard.
Moreover, Sanders suggests that the exercise of reasonable care
may, but does not automatically, require the defendant-seller to
conduct an investigation to establish her exercise of reasonable
care. 4 ' Again, the nature of the defendant-seller is a critical factor in determining whether there is an affirmative obligation to
make a reasonable investigation to establish the section 12(2)
reasonable care defense. Finally, Sanders indicates that, where an
investigation is required to show the defendant's exercise of reasonable care, the scope of any required investigation will be defined in substantial part by the nature of the defendant-seller and
her involvement in, and relationship to, the plaintiff's purchase of
the securities at issue.
B.

Other Cases Interpreting the Reasonable Care Defense of Section
12(2)

The few other cases that have addressed the affirmative defense of section 12(2) similarly reflect the flexible nature of the
reasonable care standard.' This Part briefly describes the paucity of judicial authority and commentary on this aspect of the
section 12(2) cause of action.'

Id. at 1009 (quoting Brief for SEC at 69, Sanders III, 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) (Nos.
74-2047 and 75-1260)).
140 As pointed out by Justice Powell in his dissent from the Supreme Court's denial
of the underwriter's petition for certiorari, the Seventh Circuit's ruling has the effect of
treating the section 11 due diligence requirement (which is expressly defined to include
a reasonable investigation requirement) as in pari materia with the "reasonable care" requirement of section 12(2). On its face, however "reasonable care" as used in section 12(2) seems to suggest a lesser showing than the section 11 due diligence defense,
which expressly requires each section 11 defendant to show her reasonable belief, as
formed based upon a reasonable investigation, that the registration contains no misrepresentation or omission of a material fact.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Seventh Circuit's ruling speaks only to
the situation involving an exempt distribution where the undenr-iter of the offering is sued
under section 12(2). This situation lies outside the scope of this Article, which focuses
exclusively on application of the section 12(2) reasonable care standard to post-distribution
trading, which, by definition, involves only non-undenmiter defendant-sellers.
141 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4212 ("There is not much law on how this
defense may be established.").
142 "Although the specific content of the burdens imposed by section 11 has been
examined by courts and commentators in some detail, the precise issue of its relationship
to the burdens of section 12(2) has been discussed very little." Epstein, supra note 5, at
387-88.
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The few courts that have addressed the issue of the seller's
affirmative defense have recognized that, in effect,. section 12(2)
holds the defendant-seller responsible for her negligence.1 4 3
Thus, Congress has shifted proof of the seller's non-negligence to
the defendant as the party presumably in the better position to
establish the propriety of her conduct, thereby relaxing the
plaintiff's required showing for recovery under section 12(2).'4
Since section 12(2) essentially embodies a negligence standard, the exercise of reasonable care will presumably be defined
by the facts and circumstances of each case. In addition to the
nature of the defendant-seller, the courts and commentators have
identified the following as the most important factors in determining the defendant's exercise of reasonable care:
i)

the role of the defendant-seller in the selling process;
ii) the relationship between the buyer and the
seller;
iii) the relationship between the seller and the
issuer of the security, i.e.,-the availability of
the corporation-issuer as the seller's source
of information;
iv) the circumstances under which the statements were made; and
v) what the representation
purports to
45
state.
For example, in Davis v. Avco Financing,' the court relied
on these criteria in its flexible interpretation of the section 12(2)
reasonable care defense. The facts of Davis grew out of "Dare To
Be Great" ("DTBG"),
the well-known fraudulent pyramid
scheme.14 Plaintiffs in Davis were customers of Avco Financing

143 See supra note 110 and accompanying text describing the standard required under
section 12(2) as a basic negligence standard. This Article therefore assumes that section 12(2) embodies a basic negligence standard and then offers a framework for applying this standard to the secondary market activities of various types of potential section 12(2) defendant-sellers in the trading markets.
144 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 23-24 (1933); Loss, supra note 3, at
1026.
145 See 17A HicKs, supra note 76, at 6-205; 15 LIrON, supra note 95, at 6-297.
146 739 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1984).
147 Other reported decisions arising out of the same nucleus of facts include SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enter., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); SEC
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("Avco"). Each plaintiff borrowed money from Avco at the behest
of defendant McCormack, the manager of Avco's office in Toledo,
Ohio. These plaintiffs used the borrowed funds to purchase shares
in the DTBG scheme. After Avco had made several loans to DTBG
purchasers, the promoters of DTBG invited McCormack to attend
several DTBG promotional meetings. 48 At these meetings,
McCormack distributed blank Avco loan application forms to prospective DTBG investors. Several DTBG purchasers indicated that
McCormack told them that DTBG "was a good quality investment."" When McCormack's supervisor learned of the office
manager's activities on behalf of DTBG, he ordered the Toledo
office to immediately cease making loans for investment in DTBG.
McCormack's superiors at Avco promptly recognized the fraudulent nature of Avco's pyramid scheme and ordered McCormack to
have nothing further to do with the DTBG scheme.
In finding that the Avco defendants had not established the
section 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care," the Davis
court observed:
In fact, far from attempting clandestinely to promote
a known fraudulent venture, the manager actually
suggested to his superior that Avco adopt some of
the DTBG promotional methods in its own public
relations. This caused the manager's superiors to

v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
148 See Davis, 739 F.2d at 1061.
149 Id.
150 The court specifically found that the representations made by McCormack, the
Avco office manager, were not made with the requisite degree of reasonable care. Moreover, Avco was found liable for the actions of its office manager under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. See id. at 1062 (citing Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th
Cir. 1976)). On similar facts, the court in another case, Quincy Coop. Bank v. A.G. Ed-

wards & Sons, 655 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1986), held the broker-dealer firm liable for
the conduct of its employee, a broker who actually made the misrepresentations which
induced the firm's customer, a bank, to buy the bonds through the broker-dealer firm.
The court found that the firm was responsible for its employee's actions, reasoning that
the "federal securities acts do not pre-empt the operation of common agency theories."
Id. at 82 n.1. The court observed, however, that the language of control person liability
under section 15 of the 1933 Act may complicate this analysis. See generally, Stacy D.
Blank, Section 20(a) or Respondeat Superior?: An Update, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 919
(1987); William J. Fitzpatrick & Ronald T. Carman, Respondeat Superior & The Federal Seeurities Laws: A Round Peg in a Square Hole 12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1 (1983); Steven R.
Reininger, Exclusive or Concurrent-The Role of Control & Respondeat Superior in the Imposition

of Vicarious Civil Liability on Broker-Dealers, 9 SEC. REG. LJ. 226 (1981). This issue, however,
lies outside the scope of this Article.
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make an immediate investigation. In short order, they
perceived that the whole DTBG promotion was a chimera, forbade the manager to have anything further
to do with it, and prohibited the making of any more
loans to DTBG investors.
The fact that his supervisors so promptly perceived the inherent'fallacy of the DTBG scheme indicates that its defects were obvious and that the manager, although he may have been innocent of fraudulent intent, was certainly guilty of negligence. Nor was
his sincerity of any comfort to the bilked investors.
One who is sold the Brooklyn Bridge by means of
sincere but negligent representations is nonetheless
the possessor of a worthless asset' 5 '

Most importantly, in connection with its finding that Avco, as
a section 12(2) "seller" of DTBG securities to these plaintiffs, 52
failed to exercise reasonable care, the Sixth Circuit observed that:
We believe that the following considerations are pertinent to an analysis of whether a § 12(2) seller has
established this affirmative defense: (1) the quantum
of decisional (planning) and facilitative (promotional)
participation, such as designing the deal and contacting and attempting to persuade potential purchasers,
(2) access to source data against which the truth or
falsity of representations can be tested, (3) relative

151 Davis 739 F.2d at 1062. Consistent with this view, the Second Circuit has observed that:
The statute specifically requires the defendant to show that by the exercise of
reasonable care he "could not have known" of the omission, not merely that
"he had used reasonable care" to avoid or correct the omission. 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2). It is true that in some cases evidence of steps taken to avoid or
correct an omissioft in a communication would negate reasonable knowledge
that an omission existed. Thus, broad, corrective -publication of information
might well bear on whether a defendant could reasonably have known of a
continuing material omission in the knowledge of buyers with whom he has
communicated. But reasonable effort to extinguish ignorance does not necessarily prove reasonable unawareness of continued ignorance.
Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 829 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
152 In this pre-Pinter case, the Sixth Circuit relied on the proximate cause approach
to the determination of whether a person is a "seller" for purposes of section 12(2). Of
course, this analysis would now be controlled by the Pinter formulation, assuming that the
Supreme Court will rely on the same test for section 12(2) purposes. See supra notes 6381 and accompanying text.
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skill in ferreting out the truth (for example, in this
case Avco's manager had comparatively greater skill
in evaluating judgments based on subsidiary facts,
since he performed a similar function in the process
of investigating the creditworthiness of borrowers),
(4) pecuniary interest in the completion of the transaction, and (5) the existence of a relationship of
trust and confidence between the plaintiff and the
alleged 'seller." 5
The few other cases specifically addressing the seller's section
12(2) affirmative defense," including the Davis case, primarily
have involved plaintiffs' purchases during the course of a distribution market transaction, and, therefore, they are not directly relevant to defining the parameters of the seller's exercise of reasonable care in connection with her sales activities in the seconday
markets. But to the extent that these cases rely on a flexible standard which emphasizes the nature of the defendant-seller and her
role in the sales transaction involving the plaintiff-buyer, they provide the starting point for analyzing the application of the section
12(2) reasonable care defense to sales activity occurring in the
trading markets. This analysis is expanded further in the next
section.
IV.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 12(2) REASONABLE CARE

STANDARD TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF DEFENDANT-SELLERS IN
SECONDARY MARKET TRANSACTIONS

Based on the judicial analysis described in the preceding Part,
this Part of the Article creates an analytical framework for interpreting and applying the reasonable care standard of section 12(2)
to sellers' transactions in the secondary trading markets. Consistent
with the flexible approach reflected in prior judicial interpretations, this Part focuses initially on the nature of the defendantseller and classifies prospective section 12(2) sellers into three

153 Davis, 739 F.2d at 1068.
154 See, eg., Dennis v. General Imaging, Inc., 918 F.2d 496, 507 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985); Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349,
1361 (5th Cir. 1981); Franklin Say. Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2d
Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., 661 F. Supp. 1555, 1575-76 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd,
855 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1988); Stone v. Fossil Oil & Gas, 657 F. Supp. 1449, 1460 (D.N.M.
1987); and University Hill Found. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898

(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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distinct groups: Ordinary Sellers, Control Person Sellers, and Broker-Dealer Sellers. With respect to each of these classes of prospective section 12(2) secondary market defendant-sellers, this Part will
describe the factors that determine whether the seller has exercised the requisite degree of reasonable care and thus established
an affirmative defense against secondary market buyers in privity
with the seller.
The potential liability of prospective section 12(2) defendantsellers can be thought of as lying on a continuum. Within this
continuum, Ordinary Sellers generally bear the least onerous burden in establishing their exercise of reasonable care. Thus, liability
of the Ordinary Seller should be the most remote of the various
categories of potential defendant-sellers; this makes sense because
the Ordinary Seller is usually quite removed from the sources of
any relevant information that would impact her trading in the
secondary market. Accordingly, she is unlikely to come into possession of material facts that may trigger obligations under section
12(2), including any obligation to make a reasonable investigation
in order for the Ordinary Seller to establish her exercise of reasonable care. Conversely, the highest burden will generally fall on
those sellers who are the parties closest to this information: the
issuer"' and its officers, directors, and affiliates, generally referred to as Control Person Sellers."

155 Issuer liability under section 12(2) lies outside the scope of this Article. Issuers'
sales involve "distribution transactions" for purposes of the 1933 Act. Accordingly, the
section 4(1) registration exemption, available to other secondary market sellers for their
ordinary trading activity, is unavailable to the issuer. JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 459, 480;
I Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 433. Any analysis of issuers' section 12(2) liability
presumably must take into account the due diligence standards of section 11, which apply on their face only in the context of registered distributions but which should influence the standard of reasonable care required of issuers engaged in unregistered distributions that become subject to liability under section 12(2). See DeMarco v. Edens, 390
F.2d 836, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing issuer's exercise of reasonable care in a suit
under section 12(2) arising out of an exempt public offering conducted pursuant to the
Regulation A exemption).
156 The statute does not contain any definition of the concept of control. "The absence of a definition, however, has not prevented the [SEC] by rule, ruling and releases
from [setting forth] the outlines of a definition and it has not mitigated the vital importance of determining the meaning of 'control.'" A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who's "In Control?'-S.E.C 21 Bus. LAw. 559, 560 (1966). Although the concept of control cannot be
fixed with any precision, substantial share ownership will generally cause the shareholder
to be treated as a control person of the issuer even though that person may hold no
other position with the company. Similarly, "unless a person or identifiable group dearly
is in control by reason of possession and use of voting power, all directors and policymaking officers are presumptively members of the control group and only compelling evi-
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The most complex burden, however, falls on the Broker-Dealer Seller. As will be demonstrated in the last subpart of this Part,
the threshold question of classifying a seller as a broker or dealer
is often itself a complex question. Once classified as a broker-dealer, the scope of obligations owed by the Broker-Dealer Seller to
the buyer in a post-distribution trading transaction, including the
nature of any relevant fiduciary duties, requires further analysis.
This fiduciary duty analysis further refines the scope of the BrokerDealer Seller's affirmative defense under section 12(2), including
any obligation she has to undertake a reasonable investigation of,
among other things, the facts underlying statements made by her
during the course of a secondary market transaction, even without
any evidence of constructive notice of suspicious facts and circumstances.
This Part focuses on each of these three classes of prospective
sellers in turn and describes the manner in which the reasonable
care standard should be interpreted and applied to them. 5 This

dence to the contrary should remove them from the group." Id. at 577. See also Rule
405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1992) (reflecting the SEC's definition of control). Further
elaboration on the concept of control lies outside the scope of this Article.
157 The relative burdens of proof required to establish the section 12(2) affirmative
defense according to the various categories of prospective sellers in the secondary market
that have been identified in this Article can be thought of as laying on a continuum. On
this continuum, the ordinary investor can be identified as bearing the lowest burden,
while issuers can be identified as bearing the highest burden. Between ordinary investors
and issuers, and in relative placement of burden from lowest to highest, are broker-dealers, underwriters and control persons. The placement of any particular class of sellers on
this continuum will likely change in those situations where the nature of the misrepresentation or omission does not relate to the intrinsic value of the issuer's security. See
supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text. A substantial portion of the situations that
would give rise to section 12(2) liability based on post-distribution trading activity are
likely to involve misrepresented or omitted facts relating to the nature of the issuer's
business or some other aspect that goes fundamentally to the intrinsic value of the security to be bought by the plaintiff-investor; this continuum will provide, therefore, the
focus of this Part's analysis of the flexible approach to be used in defining the relevant
standard of reasonable care to be exercised by a section 12(2) defendant-seller in the
context of post-distribution trading. Obviously, if the nature of the misrepresented or
omitted fact more properly relates to one of the other categories of material misstatements or omissions, then the dispersion of prospective section 12(2) defendant-sellers
along this continuum will change to reflect the changes in the nature of the defendants'
relationship to the underlying wrongful conduct, i.e., the corresponding change in the defendant-seller's relationship to the nature of the fraudulent misrepresentation or omission.
For example, where the material fact relates to allegations of overcharges for commissions
on a plaintiff's purchase of stock in a secondary market transaction, the burden on the
Broker-Dealer Seller should be the heaviest, and the burden on the other two classes of
prospective section 12(2) defendant-sellers in the trading markets, i.e., Ordinary Sellers
and Control Person Sellers, should be limited as a threshold matter to showing only
their lack of knowledge of any such mistaken representations in order to establish the
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guidance to the future seller of securities in the tradso that she may properly arrange for the sale in order
the basis for her section 12(2) affirmative defense of
of reasonable'care, and thereby prevent section 12(2)

liability-ls5

A.

Ordinary Investors as Seconday Market Sellers

As the Supreme Court has emphasized on numerous occasions, the starting point in any analysis of the federal securities
The language of section
laws is the statutory language itself.'
12(2) suggests that "any person" who is a "seller" is a potential
defendant."W Nothing in the statute's language, nor in the
Court's Pinter analysis of the term "seller," suggests that the ordinary lay investor is not a proper defendant; yet, at the same time,
this individual seller may also be viewed as among the intended
beneficiaries of the protections of the 1933 Act.' As a policy
matter, therefore, the vexing question is: Under what circumstances should this ordinary lay investor be moved out of the class of
intended beneficiaries of the protections created under the 1933
Act and into a category of individuals who may be regarded as
potential defendants under section 12(2)?

section 12(2) affirmative defense. See, e.g., Farley v. Baird Patrick & Co., 750 F. Supp.
1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
158 Understanding the basis for the reasonable care standard becomes an important
guide to sellers in deciding how to conduct their future trading activity in the secondary
markets. Although important in the litigation context, the scope of this defense likewise
is an important influence for shaping future behavior so that prospective sellers know
what is expected of them as they engage in their secondary market activities in order to
preserve their section 12(2) defense.
159 See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976).
160 Section 2(2) of the 1933 Act defines the term "person" broadly to mean "an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any
unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof. As used in
this paragraph the term 'trust' shall include only a trust where the interest or interests
of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security." Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1988).
161 See Loss, A RebuttaL supra note 8, at 48-49. There is at least one other place
where a person who otherwise may be presumed to be an intended beneficiary of the
protections of the 1933 Act nonetheless is held to the section 5 registration and prospectus delivery obligations by virtue of that person's relationship to the underlying
transaction: the statutory underwriter analysis of a first-tier buyer who acts as conduit for
a "distribution" and, therefore, cannot rely on the section 4(1) exemption for this
buyer's subsequent resales of the securities. See HAZEN, supra note 3, at 460-62.
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The apparent policy behind section 12(2)'s regulation of
secondary market transactions is to prevent fraud in the sense of
prohibiting any person from misleading a prospective buyer
through fraudulent communications in the form of affirmative
misrepresentations or omissions of material facts necessary to prevent the statements from being misleading. "Section 12(2) is a
regulatory statute whose purpose is to ensure that potential purchasers are given correct, material information before purchasing
securities. " 16 2 The deterrence policy of this anti-fraud provision
should extend to secondary market transactions involving ordinary
lay person investors who act as defendant-sellers. The use of the
term "person " " in section 12(2) further supports this interpretation of section 12(2)." In sum, the broad regulatory purpose
underlying section 12(2) presumably does not disappear in the
case of transactions involving Ordinary Sellers.
Accordingly, the Ordinary Seller, by virtue of the express language of section 12(2), must make truthful disclosures to any
buyer she deals with."s Moreover, the Ordinary Seller is also precluded from taking advantage of an unsuspecting buyer in a trading transaction by failing to reveal material facts necessary to make
the seller's prior statements not misleading or by otherwise misrepresenting facts to the buyer." Thus, assuming section 12(2)
in and of itself imposes no further affirmative disclosure obligation
on the Ordinary Seller,' the Ordinary Seller should easily satisfy

162 Quincy Coop. Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 655 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Mass. 1986)
(citing to Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1980)).
163 This broad definition indicates a willingness to impose fraud liability on individuals who are not securities professionals provided that the other statutory prerequisites for
liability are established. See 17A HicKs, supra note 76, at 6-12 to -13, -18.3 to -21. This
interpretation is further supported by examining the registration obligation of section 5,
which is imposed on all persons although most ordinary lay investors are permitted to
rely on the section 4(1) exemption. Id.; see also JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 110-11.
164 Quiny Coop. Bank, 655 F. Supp. at 84.
165 See Loss, supra note 3, at 888-89.
166 In this sense, section 12(2) draws on the application of common law fraud principles to commercial transactions. In commercial dealings (i.e., arms-length, bargained for
transactions), the seller cannot lie, even in the absence of any fiduciary duty. Likewise,
section 12(2) incorporates the common law doctrine of half-truths, and therefore the
Ordinary Seller cannot mislead a prospective buyer by failing to reveal material information necessary to make her statements not misleading. See 9 LoSS & SEUGMAN, supra note
32, at 4200-01.
167 Since this class of sellers is defined to exclude control persons of the issuer, no
fiduciary duty (which may otherwise create an affirmative disclosure obligation) is imposed on the Ordinary Seller as the result of some important relationship to the issuer.
In certain cases, however, a special fact situation may exist that gives rise to a claim of
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the disclosure requirements of section 12(2), especially given the
general policy of the 1933 Act which otherwise views such persons
as among the intended beneficiaries of the 1933 Act.
From the perspective of the buyer in a secondary market
transaction, section 12(2) can be seen as a substantial improvement over the common law remedy of fraud with regard to 'the
situation of actionable nondisclosure occurring during the course
of a securities trading transaction."S Since section 12(2) was specifically crafted to ease the plaintiff-buyer's burden of proof, the
plaintiff-buyer need only establish a material misstatement or the
omission of a material fact necessary to make any statement"
made by the seller not misleading; the plaintiff-buyer need not
independently establish the seller's duty to disclose such information to buyer. It is enough that the plaintiff-buyer establish privity
with the defendant-seller."" The burden then shifts to the seller

fiduciary duty between a prospective buyer and an Ordinary Seller (as where the secondary market sale is between related parties such as a husband and wife, or the trustee of
an express trust and a named beneficiary of trust). In such cases, the language of section 12(2) presumably incorporates the common law perspective so as to create the basis
for imposing an affirmative disclosure obligation under section 12(2) on such sellers. See
9 LOSS & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 4201-02. In addition, the existence of this special
relationship of trust and confidence presumably will impact the analysis of the Ordinary
Seller's exercise of "reasonable care," principally regarding the question of whether this
Ordinary Seller now has some obligation to go beyond the standard of reasonable care
otherwise applicable to Ordinary Sellers because of this factual showing of a special relationship of trust and confidence. As a result of this separate fiduciary relationship between the parties to the transaction, the Ordinary Seller may now be subject to an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable investigation as part of that seller's burden to
demonstrate her exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2). Analysis of the scope of
the Ordinary Seller's responsibility in these situations presumably will more closely parallel the analysis used in the situation of the Broker-Dealer Seller who, as a result of the
brokerage relationship between this defendant-seller and the buyer, incurs further responsibilities in connection with proving her section 12(2) defense.
168 At early common law, the fhilure to disclose material facts usually was actionable
only if the seller was subject to some independent source of fiduciary duty sufficient to
create an affirmative obligation to make full disclosure. In the absence of such a duty,
silence on the part of the seller generally was not actionable. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 737-38 (5th ed. 1984); Donald C.
Langevoort, Fraud and Deception by &curtier .Profeniemls, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1254
(1983).
1
169 "Statement," as used in section 12(2), may be interpreted to include implied representations by the seller. See 9 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 3772-98; see infra
notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
170 From the secondary market sellei's perspective, the concept of privity plays an
important role in limiting the availability of this cause of action and, derivatively, in limiting the scope of the seller's affirmative disclosure obligations as well as the scope of the
prospective defendant-seller's liability for money damages.
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to demonstrate that she exercised "reasonable care" and that the
omission of a material fact was not the result of any failure of the
defendant to conduct herself properly.
The question then becomes: What is required of the Ordinary
Seller to establish her exercise of reasonable care, thereby allowing
her to prove her affirmative defense? In particular, does the Ordinary Seller have any obligation to make a "reasonable investigation" of the issuer or its business or other matters prior to a secondary market sale in order to preserve her section 12(2) reasonable care defense? In examining the reasonable care defense from
the perspective of the Ordinary Seller, it becomes important to
distinguish between two types of transactions involving the secondary trading of securities by Ordinary Sellers: (i) face-to-face sales;
and (ii) exchange or over-the-counter (OTC) trading. Each of
these situations will be examined separately.
1.

Face-to-Face Transactions

In a face-to-face transaction, the Ordinary Seller has an affirmative duty to tell the truth in her dealings with the buyer.""
This obligation should be relatively easy for the Ordinary Seller to
satisfy in a face-to-face transaction because the buyer is readily
identifiable. In the absence of some facts suggesting an independent basis for some further disclosure obligation,7 2 the section
12(2) disclosure burden is thereby presumably satisfied.
A separate issue, however, focuses on whether the exercise of
"reasonable care" requires the Ordinary Seller to make a "reasonable investigation" of the facts underlying any statements made by
this seller. In the case of statements made by the Ordinary Seller
bearing on the intrinsic value of the securities, such as opinions"' about the issuer's business or its securities, no such additional investigation should be required of the Ordinary Seller. As
to the Ordinary Seller, section 12(2) presumably is intended only

171 As previously noted, satisfaction of the anti-fraud regulatory policy underlying section 12(2) presumably also incorporates the common law doctrine of half-truths and
therefore requires the Ordinary Seller to disclose any facts known to the seller that are
necessary to make the statements of that seller not misleading. See supra notes 167-68 and
accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 166-68 and infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text, which discusses the extent of the affirmative disclosure obligations imposed by section 12(2).
173 Statements of opinion, of course, are subject to a threshold analysis of whether
they constitute "facts" subject to regulation by section 12(2). See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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to require truthful and complete disclosure at the time of sale to
her secondary market buyer 74 but is not intended to obligate
her to verify the basis of her opinions oi- other statements to the
1 75

buyer.

A further question is whether the Ordinary Seller's knowledge
of material facts triggers some independent duty to investigate. In
other words, does the Ordinary Seller, by virtue of some questionable information in her possession, receive constructive notice
which then triggers some obligation to make a "reasonable investigation" to preserve the statute's affirmative defense? Or, alterna-

tively, may the Ordinary Seller rely on the full disclosure policy of
the 1933 Act and shift any duty to investigate to the prospective
buyer by making full disclosure to the buyer of all material facts
within the Ordinary Seller's possession? 6 Under an approach
that favors full disclosure and that recognizes the limited access

the Ordinary Seller generally has to the issuer to verify facts about

174 What if the Ordinary Seller possesses knowledge of material facts, but makes no
statements to the prospective buyer? In such a case, the doctrine of half-truths generally
is not available to impose an obligation on the Ordinary Seller, under section 12(2), of
full disclosure so that the statements made by such seller be not misleading. At common
law, at least in the case of insider trading involving corporate fiduciaries, the special facts
doctrine was relied on to trigger an affirmative disclosure obligation on the part of such
sellers, at least in the case of certain face-to-face dealings. See HAMILTON, supra note 4, at
933-34. It is unclear whether this doctrine extends to trigger a similar disclosure obligation on the part of the Ordinary Seller (ie., a non-fiduciary) for purposes of section 12(2).
The express language of section 12(2), however, does not seem to impose any affirmative disclosure obligation on sellers in general since, by its terms, it only requires
disclosure of those facts necessary to make the statements made by the seller not misleading. At a minimum, the nature of the face-to-face dealings between the buyer and
Ordinary Seller may involve (or may, in fact, create as to that particular securities transaction) a special relationship of trust and confidence that provides an independent
source of disclosure obligation on the Ordinary Seller. In any case, the scope of affirmative disclosure obligation imposed on Ordinary Sellers under section 12(2) remains unclear. See 9 Loss & SELiGMAN, supra note 32, at 4200-02.
175 The doctrine of half-truths may, however, require the Ordinary Seller to disclose
the basis, no matter how flimsy, of her opinions or other material statements, in order
that these statements do not mislead the buyer by inferring some greater factual basis
than the Ordinary Seller actually possesses.
176 In other words, in the event that the Ordinary Seller is on notice of suspicious
facts or circumstances, and the transaction involves face-to-face dealings between the parties, the plaintiff-buyer presumably can establish some factual basis to support a claim
that either (i) such disclosure is necessary under section 12(2) in order to make the
(express or implied) statements made by the Ordinary Seller not misleading; or, alternatively, (ii) a special relationship of trust and confidence exists between this buyer and the
Ordinary Seller that is sufficient to require this Seller to make full disclosure to satisfy
section 12(2).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1

the issuer and its business, truthful disclosure of all material facts
by the Ordinary Seller to the buyer during the course of their
dealings should be sufficient. If the transaction proceeds following
full disclosure by the Ordinary Seller, presumably the parties will
negotiate a price to reflect the cost of investigation or to reflect
the buyer's assumption of the risk in the event no investigation is
undertaken prior to sale.'
2.

Exchange or OTC Transactions

In the case of sales executed over the exchanges or in the
OTC market, the Ordinary Seller presumably faces the same reasonable care burden as applied in the case of the Ordinary
Seller's face-to-face transactions: The Ordinary Seller must make
truthful disclosures to the buyer. Similarly, the Ordinary Seller
presumably has no independent duty to conduct a "reasonable
investigation" to establish her exercise of reasonable care as a
threshold matter.
In most anonymous trading transactions occurring on the exchanges or in the OTC market, the Ordinary Seller accesses these
markets through a broker-dealer' and thus has no direct dealings with the buyer on the other side of the trade. In these anon-

177 Alternatively, the parties could agree that the Ordinary Seller assume the burden
to investigate, and the acquisition of further information following any such investigation
would further refine the scope of the Ordinary Seller's responsibility at that point. A
further issue arises, however. What would be a "reasonable" investigation for purposes of
an Ordinary Seller in this situation? Presumably not as much as is required in a similar
situation involving either a Control Person Seller or a Broker-Dealer Seller since the
Ordinary Seller usually does not have the same accessibility to the relevant sources of information. Moreover, if the Ordinary Seller were to assume the burden of such an investigation, presumably it would be by the parties' mutual agreement, i.e., the only way
the sale will go forward following the truthful disclosure of the suspicious facts by the
Ordinary Seller (which should be all that is otherwise required of the Ordinary Seller to
satisfy her section 12(2) obligation to exercise reasonable care) is if the Ordinary Seller
conducts a further investigation into the suspicious facts and circumstances that have
been disclosed to the buyer during the course of the parties' direct dealings. In this
case, however, the parties presumably will have defined (either expressly or impliedly) the
scope of any such investigation and the consequences to follow upon the Ordinary
Seller's subsequent disclosure of the results of her further investigation.
178 In executing her customer's sell order, the broker-dealer presumably acts as the
seller's agent and therefore falls within the Pinter formulation of a seller for purposes of
section 12(2). A separate set of obligations on the part of the broker-dealer may arise as
a result of her activities undertaken to find a buyer for the Ordinary Seller's securities.
The broker-dealer therefore must conduct herself in a manner sufficient to establish
independently her "exercise of reasonable care" under section 12(2). See infra Part IV.C
(discussing basis of broker-dealer's statutory defense as to section 12(2) suit brought by
plaintiff-buyer).
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ymous transactions, there should be relatively few opportunities for
the Ordinary Seller to make statements of material fact to the
buyer or to mislead the buyer by omitting material facts necessary
to make the statements of the Ordinary Seller not misleading.
Moreover, in the absence of any direct dealings between the Ordinary Seller and her buyer, there generally will be no factual basis
for finding a common law relationship of trust and confidence
that may otherwise create such an affirmative disclosure obligation.
This understanding of the requirements of section 12(2)
squarely poses the question of whether section 12(2) forms the
basis for an affirmative disclosure obligation on the part of the
Ordinary Seller. For the reasons discussed above, section 12(2)
presumably may not be treated as a separate source of an express
disclosure obligation to be imposed on all sellers, including Ordinary Sellers, irrespective of any underlying, independent source for
such an affirmative disclosure obligation." 9 Further, if section
12(2) were found to impose such a disclosure burden on sellers of
securities, how would the Ordinary Seller satisfy this obligation in
the context of an exchange or OTG transaction?"so In an openmarket transaction, the Ordinary Seller potentially is in privity with
the whole world and thus any disclosure, obligation imposed on
her presumably could be satisfied only through full and adequate
disclosure to all prospective buyers (i.e., the whole world)."

179 This understanding of the scope of section 12(2)'s disclosure requirements presumably applies in the case of the Ordinary Seller's open-market transactions for the
same reasons that are described above in connection with the Ordinary Seller's face-to-face
sales to the buyer. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text. See also 9 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 4200-02.
180 In the case of the Ordinary Seller's responsibility in a face-to-face transaction, the
logistics of providing effective disclosure presumably are much simpler, perhaps justifying
different treatment of the Ordinary Seller's face-to-face transactions. Moreover, as pointed
out in the discussion above regarding the Ordinary Seller's direct dealings with the buyer, it is likely that sufficient facts will exist either (i) to create a claim by the plaintiffbuyer that the Ordinary Seller omitted material facts necessary to make her statements
not misleading, or, alternatively, (ii) to support a claim of some special relationship of
trust and confidence sufficient to support a duty to make full disclosure. It is unlikely
that sufficient facts will exist in the case of open-market transactions to support such a
claim by the buyer.
181 If this approach were taken, then the Ordinary Seller who is in possession of
material facts presumably would be left with no choice but to hold the stock and "ride
the market down." In cases where the Ordinary Seller is in possession of material, nonpublic facts about the issuer, these facts generally are negative (i.e. "bad news"). The
Ordinary Seller, therefore, seeks to cut her losses by selling the shares into the market
piior to disclosure of the bad news. As a policy matter, however, this may not be a fair
result in light of the fact that, to some extent, the Ordinary Seller is a member of the
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Practically speaking, this is an impossible burden for the Ordinary
Seller to satisfy."s
In light of these considerations, the prudent understanding of
section 12(2), at least as to Ordinary Sellers, is to require truthful
and complete communications but not to interpret section 12(2)
as imposing an affirmative disclosure obligation on this class of
sellers either as part of the anti-fraud, regulatory purpose of section 12(2), or as part of the seller's burden to demonstrate the
exercise of reasonable care.ss
B.

"Control Persons" of Issuer as Secondary Market Sellers

This Part focuses on the standard to be imposed on "control
persons"" in defining their exercise of reasonable care under
section 12(2) in connection with their trading of the issuer's securities in the secondary markets. In determining the scope of the
Control Person Seller's obligations under section 12(2), the
issuer's responsibilities under section 12(2) must be considered.
For purposes of the 1933 Act, issuers cannot engage in secondary market transactions because the statute generally treats any
transaction by an issuer in its own securities as a "distribution." As
such, the issuer is subject to the disclosure requirements imposed
by section 5 of the 1933 Act. Alternatively, the issuer may seek to

group to be protected by the enactment of the 1933 Act. Yet, at the same time, to do
otherwise is to allow this Ordinary Seller to shift the burden of loss to some other unsuspecting open-market buyer who likewise was the intended beneficiary of the 1933 Act
protections.
182 And what if the Ordinary Seller possesses facts that give rise to constructive notice sufficient to trigger an obligation to make a reasonable investigation? Must the Ordinary Seller conduct such an investigation prior to her sale in the open market-, The Ordinary Seller in an open market transaction, unlike the situation involved'in the case of
direc dealings between a buyer and an Ordinary Seller, presumably cannot readily negotiate to shift the burden to investigate to the buyer since generally the Ordinary Seller is
handicapped in identifying the buyer in an exchange or OTC transaction.
183 Perhaps at this point the policies underlying the Rule 10b-5 cause of action of
the 1934 Act become most directly relevant to the section 12(2) analysis. The Rule 101-5
analytical framework seems to strongly suggest that no duty of disclosure is imposed on
the Ordinary Seller, at least in the context of her open market transactions. See Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); HAZEN, supra
note 3, § 13.10, at 753-57; 7 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 3517.
184 Regarding the definition of "control," see generally Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405
(1992); 4 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 1691-92; JAMES D. COX, SECURITIES REGU-

LATION, 458-60. For purposes of this Article, the analysis of the section 12(2) liability of
Control Person Sellers assumes that the individual satisfics the relevant standard for "control person," and therefore, any extended discussion of the determination of control
person status is outside the scope of this Article.
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avoid the time and expense involved in preparing a registration
statement by relying on an exemption from registration, including
the private placement exemption of section 4(2)-for certain types
of primary offerings."ss However, the issuer faces a fairly substantial disclosure obligation in order to satisfy the requirements of
the section 4(2) private placement exemption." The issuer carries the burden of establishing"7 that all the offerees have available to them the information that registration otherwise would
provide."a
In the case of a registered offering, the issuer will face virtually
strict liability for any material misrepresentation or omission in the
registration statement. 9 In the case of a misrepresefitation or
omission of a material fact made during the course of an exempt
offering, the issuer may face fraud liability under section
12(2)." At a minimum, therefore, the issuer must establish that
it exercised "reasonable care" in order to avoid liability to buyers
who are in privity with the issuer. 9'
In the case of either a registered or exempt offering, the
issuer is involved in a distribution transaction.'9 2 Once the securi-

185 See The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1988); JENNINGS,
supra note 6, at 324.
186 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); see generally HAZEN, supra
note 3, at 185-93 ("[A]ccess to information is a precondition to any section 4(2) exemption.").
187 The party claiming the exemption has the burden of proving all the elements of
the exemption, thereby perfecting the claim that the section 5 registration and prospectus delivery requirements do not apply to this transaction. Id. at 119.
188 In general, four factors have long been identified as being particularly important
in establishing the issuer's section 4(2) exemption: (1) the number of offerees and their
relationship to each other and to the issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the
size of the offering; and (4) the manner of the offering. See General Counsel's Opinion,
Securities Act Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935; JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 325-28; Cox,
supra note 184, at 375-76.
189 In this situation, liability generally lies under section 11, and there is no due diligence defense available to the issuer under section 11. SeeJENNINGS, supra note 6, at 879;
Epstein, supra note 5, at 388.
190 See, eg., DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968).
191 In light of the failure to provide the issuer any due diligence defense under section 11, the issuer faces a very heavy burden under section 12(2) (imposing liability for
fraud in the case of both registered and unregistered offerings). See DeMarco, 390 F.2d at
841. Any further discussion of the scope of the issuer's reasonable care defense is outside
the scope of this Article, which focuses on transactions occurring in the trading markets.
See supra note 156.
192 Discussion of the ismuer' fraud liability under section 12(2) lies outside the scope
of this Article, which focuses on section 12(2) liability for fraudulent trading in the secondasy markets. The issuer's standard of care under section 12(2) is relevant only for
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ties are issued, however, the subsequent transfer of such instruments (or any interest therein) will occur in a secondary market
transaction. These post-distribution transactions involve resales by
investor-owners who are either control persons 93 or non-control
persons."M In determining the burdens imposed by section 12(2)
on the control person in connection with her resales of the
issuer's securities,"15 including the obligation to exercise reasonable care, a distinction must be made as to whether such resales
occur in a face-to-face transaction or in an open market transaction, either on an exchange or in the OTC market.
1.

Face-to-Face vs. Open Market Transactions

For purposes of the 1933 Act, the control person is generally
treated as tantamount to the issuer. Indeed, one definition of
"control" has suggested that a control person is any person who is
in a position to cause the issuer to file a registration statement for
the sale of its securities."9 Such a person is in a position not only to compel the issuer to take the legal steps necessary to effectuate such a transaction but also to insist on compliance with the
disclosure requirements imposed by the federal securities laws, in
particular, the items of disclosure required under the relevant
form of registration statement to be used in connection with the
issuer's proposed offering.
Consequently, the control person who effects resales in the
secondary markets that rise to the level of a distribution 9 ' is
treated as an issuer for purposes of the statute's definition of an

purposes of analyzing the scope of responsibility of Control Person Sellers under section 12(2). Se also supra note 154.
193 This discussion assumes the Control Person Seller is not a broker-dealer.
194 A non-control person may be either an Ordinary Seller or a broker-dealer.
195 By definition, a control person is a "control person" as to that issuer; thus, this
Article is concerned exclusively with the control person's resales of that issuer's securities.
As to any other securities that may be in the control person's investment portfolio, a
separate analysis is required to determine whether the individual is a "control person" as
to the issuers of these other securities, or an ordinary investor, non-control person holder of such securities. As to the latter, presumably the owner would be treated as an
Ordinary Seller in connection with her disposition of these securities.
196 See Sommer, supra note 156, at 591.
197 The control clause language of the section 2(11) definition of a statutory underwriter is directed at the problem posed by a control person's resales in the secondary
market that rise to the level of a "distribution" even though effected through regular way
trading transactions in the secondary markets. See United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589
(1946).
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underwriter, and the transaction, therefore, is subject to the full
panoply of registration requirements under section 5 of the 1933
Act. 98 The statute assumes that the control person will be in a
position to provide the disclosures required to satisfy the section 5
registration obligation. This burden, therefore, is not an insurmountable obstacle to the control person's resale activity in the
secondary trading markets."
In analyzing a control person's liability under section 12(2)
for resales of her control securities in a trading market transaction, it is instructive to look further to the requirements for a
control person's Private resale of securities under the provision
dubbed the "section 4(1 )" exemption. °° In general, a resale
exempt under section 4(1 ) must meet at least some of the criteria imposed on a private placement transaction conducted pursuant to the section 4(2) exemption. 0 ' As such, the control person
(as the party claiming the benefit of this hybrid exemption), generally must be able to demonstrate that the purchaser(s) met the
qualifications of section 4(2), including an inquiry into 2°the prospective buyer's investment sophistication where relevant.1
The most important of the requirements for the issuer's section 4(2) exemption is that the prospective purchaser "have access
to current information about the issuer similar to the types of
information that would be made available through a registration
Similarly, the availability of current information
statement."'
about the issuer is generally viewed as one of the most important
criteria in determining the availability of the section 4(1 ) exemp-

198 See WoYson, 405 F.2d at 782; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE,
FEDERAL SUPERVISION OF TRAFFIC IN INVESTMENT SECURmES IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 13-14 (1933).
199 Moreover, where a control person's resales in the secondary market rise to the
level of a "distribution," such resales usually must be 'conducted on a registered basis. See
JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 239-40, 486-87. Further analysis of section 12(2) as it applies to
"secondary distributions" by control persons is provided in the author's article, The Future
of Securities Ad Section 12(2), to be published in ALA. L. REV. (Fall 1993).
200 SeeJENNINGS, supra note 6, at 507-14.
201 Accordingly, the control person must avoid any general solicitation or general
advertising, as well preferably limit the number of offerees, or, at the very least, the
number of section 4(11h) sales that occur within a narrow time frame. See generally Carl
W. Schneider, Section 4(112)-Private Resales of Restricted 'or Control Securities, 49 OHIO ST.
UJ. 501, 506-07 (1988); Christopher D. Olander & Margaret S. Jacks, The Section 4(11/2)
Exemption-Reading Between the Lines of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 339, 359-

62 (1988).
202 See Schneider, supra note 201, at 509; Hazen, supra note 3, at 222-23.
203 HAZEN, supmr note 3, at 224 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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tion for the control person's resale activity.214 Indeed, at least
one commentator has suggested that the scope of the seller's
disclosure obligations under the section 4(1 ) exemption "should
depend upon the Holder's status as an insider [i.e., control person] and also upon access to material information that is unavailable to the Purchaser."' Accordingly, the control person, who
seeks to make a private resale of her control securities, inherits a
fairly heavy burden to provide full disclosure to the prospective
buyer of her securities.'
The implications of this analysis of the exemptions available
to avoid the section 5 registration and disclosure obligations'
for a control person's resales are fairly clear. For purposes of
section 12(2), the Control Person Seller must be completely truthful and careful not to omit any facts necessary to make her
statements to a buyer in the secondary market not misleading.'
In addition, as a result of the direct dealings between a Control
Person Seller and a prospective buyer (as would usually occur in
the case of a private resale exemption under section 4(1 )), the
plaintiff-buyer may be able to establish the factual basis for a relationship of trust and confidence sufficient to create an independent basis for imposing an affirmative disclosure obligation on the
Control Person Seller under section 12(2).' In sum, consistent
with the strong 1933 Act policy favoring full disclosure of all material facts, section 12(2) presumably imposes a heavy burden on the
Control Person Seller (who after all is treated as the issuer under
the statutory definition of underwriter) to come forward and dis-

204 Id. at 225; Olander & Jacks, supra note 201, at 359-60.
205 Schneider, supra note 201, at 507.
206 See HAZEN, sufpa note 3, at 226 ("[A] selling shareholder who is an insider or
control person may have certain additional disclosure obligations."). This disclosure burden is imposed as a condition to the availability of the section 4(1h) exemption for the
resale activity in the secondary market.
207 As an alternative to relying on the section 4(1) exemption for her resale activity
in the secondary markets, the Control Person Seller may opt to register her shares in
compliance with the section 5 registration burden. The shelf registration procedures developed by the SEC facilitate this registered secondary distribution on behalf of a control
person. Se Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1992); JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 239-49.
208 In addition, as a control person, there may be state law fiduciary duties that
apply in the context of the control person's resale activity that create an independent
disclosure obligation, such as the fiduciary duties of a director or dominant shareholder.
See eg., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471-74 (Cal. 1969); ROBERT CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW, 486-94 (1986).
209 This interpretation of the section 12(2) disclosure burden is further reinforced by
reference to the control person's registration obligations under section 5 of the 1933 Act.
See supra notes 197-202.
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close all material facts in scrupulously fair fashion so as to avoid
section 12(2) liability for misleading statements or omissions of
material fact.
By contrast, in the case of the control person's resale activity
in open market trading transactions, the SEC usually maintains
that the Control Person Seller can sell only within the quantity
limitations and other restrictions of Rule 144 for these activities to
be treated as a nondistribution. Not coincidentally, Rule 144 imposes disclosure obligations on this resale activity as well by requiring the control person to demonstrate inter alia the issuer's
full compliance with its 1934 Act reporting obligations. 2 10 Thus,
Rule 144 treats all open market resales by control persons as requiring fairly substantial disclosure by the Control Person Seller.
In sum, the requirements of Rule 144, as applied to the control
person's open market resales, further buttress the fairly significant
disclosure burden otherwise imposed on the Control Person Seller
under section 12(2).1
2.

The Control' Person's Exercise of Reasonable Care

The remaining question is: What is required of a Control
Person Seller to demonstrate her exercise of reasonable care for
purposes of her section 12(2) defense, including any burden she
may have to undertake a "reasonable investigation"? In light of the
preceding discussion, it seems clear that the Control Person Seller
must make full and adequate disclosure of all material facts in
order to demonstrate that she conducted herself in compliance
with the mandate of section 12(2). To do otherwise is to allow the
control person to sell securities to an unsuspecting buyer in the
trading markets, knowing that this buyer cannot be as knowledgeable as the Control Person Seller about the issuer and the issuer's
business operations and financial affairs.

210 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (1992).
211 Policy considerations are consistent with this interpretation of the control person's
section 12(2) burden. As set forth above, see upra notes 197-208 and accompanying text,
the Control Person Seller is treated as an "issuer" under the section 2(11) definition of
underwriter, as such, the control person is closest to the facts necessary to determine the
truthfulness of any statements made or that underlie any suspicious circumstances that
may exist regarding the issuer and its business. Therefore, any scaling back of the disclosure or investigative burden- imposed on the Control Person Seller would seem only to
significantly increase transaction costs and the risk of fraud contrary to the purposes of
the 1933 Act, and more particularly the anti-fraud purpose of section 12(2) of the 1933
Act. See also Olander & Jacks, supra note 201, at 35963.
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Since prior interpretations of section 12(2) have incorporated
common law principles into the analysis of the statute's reasonable
care standard, it seems that the dominant position of the control
person with respect to the issuer must be taken into account.
Accordingly, the Control Person Seller's exercise of reasonable
care should require, at a minimum, that she make full and adequate disclosure of all material facts known to her about the issuer
and its business. 12 Moreover, the Control Person Seller should
be required to show that she had some reasonable basis for any
statements or representations she may have made to the buyer,
including any information about the issuer and its business operations and financial affairs.21 In the absence of any such reasonable basis, the Control Person Seller presumably will not be able
to sustain the burden of demonstrating her exercise of reasonable
care. 214 The statute's recognition of the special status of control
persons justifies treating their burden under section 12(2) differently than that of the Ordinary Seller.
In circumstances involving suspicious facts or circumstances regarding the nature of the issuer and its busihess, the Control
Person Seller presumably must conduct a fairly thorough investigation in order to establish her exercise of reasonable care. Unlike
the Ordinary Seller, the Control Person Seller should have ready
access to the issuer and its operations and key personnel sufficient

212 Although fairly heavy, this should not be an insurmountable burden, particularly
in the case of resales involving a Control Person Seller and a buyer who is also a control
person of the issuer. See, e.g., Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1976);
Heffernan v. Pacific Dunlop GBN Corp., 767 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (illustrating
that the course of dealing, and the relationship of the Control Person Seller to the
transaction, as well as to the plaintiff-buyer, are also important factors in defining the
relevant standard for the defendant's exercise of reasonable care, consistent with prior
case law interpretation of the section 12(2) affirmative defense). Further discussion of
other aspects of these section 12(2) cases involving secondary distributions by Control
Person Sellers is provided in the author's article, The Future of &curitiet Ac Section 12(2)
to be published in ALA. L. REV. (Fall 1993).
213 Thus, the buyer could reasonably assume that the Control Person Seller has investigated the relevant facts necessary to support any assertions made by this seller and
further, that the Control Person Seller is not aware of any suspicious facts or circumstances that would cast doubt on the veracity of her statements to the buyer.
214 As with Ordinary Sellers, resales by control persons are most likely to involve "bad
news." In other words, the Control Person Seller is likely to be "dumping" the issuer's
stock to cut her losses by selling to unsuspecting members of the investing public in
advance of public disclosure of the bad news. The policy of the 1933 Act, as described
above, see supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text, provides support for imposing an
obligation on the control person to make full disclosure of the "bad news" before engaging in any resale activity in the secondary markets.
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to ascertain the true nature of the facts. Thus, where suspicious
circumstances put the Control Person Seller on constructive notice, she should be required to undertake a thorough investigation
of these circumstances. Mere disclosure to the prospective secondary market buyer should not be enough to establish the Control
Person Seller's exercise of reasonable care." 5 The strong disclosure policy underlying the 1933 Act, and the regulatory purpose
underlying section 12(2), should preclude the Control Person Seller-unlike the Ordinary Seller-from shifting the burden of investigation to the prospective buyer.
This analysis of the Control Person Seller's exercise of reasonable care should remain the same regardless of whether her
trading occurs in a face-to-face transaction or in an anonymous,
open market transaction. In each case, the section 12(2) policy
remains the same: full and adequate disclosure of all material
facts, including an affirmative obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of any suspicious facts or circumstances and an obligation to make full disclosure of all material facts learned as a
result of the Control Person Seller's investigation. As a control
person, with access to. the financial press, this seller presumably
does not face any practical obstacles to making effective disclosure
of such material information to either the face-to-face, readily
identifiable buyer or to the anonymous buyers in the open markets. The control person's position with respect to the issuer distinguishes her from the Ordinary Seller and eliminates the logistical problems that the Ordinary Seller would face if this disclosure obligation were made part of the Ordinary Seller's exercise of
reasonable care under section 12(2)."6

215 Where the prospective buyer is himself a control person of the issuer, however,
the Control Person Seller, following full disclosure of all material facts, presumably
should be able to negotiate to shift to this prospective buyer any burden to investigate
these suspicious circumstances. In this situation, each side to the transaction presumably
has equivalent access to the underlying source of information (i.e., the issuer and its key
personnel) necessary to conduct a reasonable investigation of the suspicious circumstances. As to the non-control person buyer, however, this assumption does not hold and
therefore a fundamental question of fairness is involved. In other words, under what set
of circumstances is it reasonable for the Control Person Seller to shift this burden of
investigation to the buyer and yet claim- that she has satisfied her exercise of reasonable
care? Presumably, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the Control Person Seller to
shift responsibility for such an investigation to the non-control persdn buyer.
216 See supra notes 169-70, 17--74 and accompanying text.
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Securities Professionals as Sellers: Broker-Dealers as Seconday
Market Sellers

Section 12(2) liability has been imposed on broker-dealers for
their sales activity during the course of distribution transactions21
or secondary trading transactions. 28 Historically, the courts have
taken into account the nature of the underlying transaction in
analyzing the broker-dealer's exercise of reasonable care for purposes of section 12(2). 19 Most of the prior cases, however, have
involved exempt distribution transactions. As a result, the analysis of
the section 12(2) reasonable care defense has been heavily influenced by the section 11 due diligence criteria that apply in the
case of registered distributions.
In the case of secondary market, post-distribution transactions,
the analysis shifts away from the section 11 due diligence criteria
and properly focuses instead on the nature of the underlying trading activity. Consequently, as this Part has demonstrated with respect to other secondary market sellers, the nature of the defendant-seller and her relationship to the buyer are crucial to determining the appropriate standard for the seller's exercise of reasonable care. With respect to the Broker-Dealer Seller involved in a
secondary market transaction, however, a new and important dimension is added to the analysis of the defendant's exercise of
reasonable care. The scope of the Broker-Dealer Seller's affirmative defense under section 12(2) must account for any fiduciary
duties owed by that Broker-Dealer Seller to that buyer in connection with the execution of that trade.
This Part first describes the criteria that influence the section
12(2) reasonable care standard as applied to Broker-Dealer Sellers.
Once a brokerage relationship is found to exist between the Broker-Dealer Seller and the buyer, certain well-established doctrines
arising under both common law agency principles as well as the
federal securities laws become important in establishing the nature

217 See 17A HICICS, supra note 76; 15 LIrON, supra note 95.
218 See 17A HICKS, supra note 76; supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
219 See 17A HICKS, supra note 76, at 6-299. Unlike Professor Kaminsky, who advocates
a rule of almost absolute equivalency between the section 11 due diligence standard and
the section 12(2) reasonable care standard, see KAMINSKY, supra note 109, Professor Hicks
advocates a flexible application of the section 12(2) reasonable care standard that recognizes that the section 11 due diligence standards may be relevant to defining the scope
of reasonable care under section 12(2), depending on the nature of the underlying transaction and the broker-dealer's relationship to it. See 17A HICKS, supra note 76, at 6-299.
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of the obligations owed by the Broker-Dealer Seller to the prospective buyer. These established doctrines include the SEC-developed shingle theory and the suitability doctrine. Application of
these principles to a particular secondary market transaction will
be further influenced by the nature of the misrepresented or
omitted fact, as well as by the nature of the broker-dealer's involvement in the underlying trading transaction, such as whether
the broker-dealer acted exclusively as the agent of the seller or
acted in a dual agency capacity representing both the buyer and
the actual owner of the securities.
After providing an overview of the criteria that define the
scope of the brokerage relationship and any related fiduciary duties, the last subpart of this Part illustrates the application of these
established principles to the trading activity at issue in the Ballay
case. In this manner, the Article will demonstrate that the incorporation of these well-accepted principles into the analysis of the
broker-dealer's exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2)
should not bring the securities brokerage industry to its knees.
Rather, these doctrines already guide the broker-dealer in the
secondary markets. Consequently, to avoid section 12(2) liability,
broker-dealers need only conduct their activities in the secondary
markets in accordance with familiar standards that have previously
been relied on to define the obligations and responsibilities arising out of the brokerage relationship.
1.

The Nature of the Relationship Between the Broker-Dealer
Seller and the Buyer

(a) The Fiduciary Relationship.-The reasonable care defense of
section 12(2) must recognize that in many situations, such as in
Ballay, the broker-dealer who acts as a seller of securities to the
plaintiff-investor also stands in a fiduciary relationship with the
plaintiff as a result of the brokerage relationship established between the broker-dealer and the prospective buyer. The brokerage
relationship is a form of common law agency, in which the customer generally is regarded as the principal and the broker-dealer
acts on behalf of the customer as his agent. As such, the common
law rules governing the agency relationship, including the fiduciary
duty doctrine encompassing the agent's duty of care, as well as the
duty of loyalty, apply to this brokerage relationship." ° In addi-

220

William 0.

Douglas & George E. Bates, Stock "Brokers" As Agents and Deal=rs, 43
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tion, the federal securities laws impose their own set of obligations
to further flesh out the nature of the brokerage relationship."
The existence of this relationship then further refines the standard of reasonable care that the Broker-Dealer Seller must establish to sustain her section 12(2) affirmative defense.
As a threshold matter, however, it must be determined whether a fiduciary relationship between the broker-dealer and the customer has been established. Determining when a broker-dealer has
assumed a fiduciary position with respect to her customer is often
difficult to recognize2 2 2 because generally, a broker-dealer can
deal with a customer as either an agent (broker) or a principal
(dealer).
When a broker-dealer executes a transaction for a retail customer in an exchange market, the broker-dealer almost always acts
in a broker capacity, thus establishing an agency relationship and
assuming some sort of fiduciary position with respect to her customer.2s In OTC transactions, on the other hand, a broker-dealer generally must decide whether to act as an agent or a principal
in the absence of an agreement with the customer. The decision
to execute a particular transaction as a principal or an agent,
therefore, is usually left to the broker-dealer's discretion.224
The manner of execution of trading activity on behalf of a
customer, however, is not the sole determinant of whether a fiduciary relationship between the broker-dealer and the customer has
been established. Traditionally, the SEC has emphasized that the
existence of a fiduciary relationship in these situations turns on
whether the broker-dealer has placed herself in a position of trust

YALE L.J. 46, 59-60 (1933); Randall W. Quinn, Dea Vu All Over Again: The SEC's Return to
Agency Theory in Regulating Broker-Dealers, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 61 (1990); WOLiSON,
supra note 95, at 2-39 to -43, S2-64 (Supp. 1985).
221 Section 12(2) is worried about buyers only; it creates no remedy for the defrauded seller. See supra notes 3-4, 72 and accompanying text. Accordingly, for purposes
of defining the Broker-Dealer Seller's exercise of reasonable care, the focus is on the
relationship that exists between the broker-dealer and the buyer. The implications arising
out of any agency relationship that may exist between the seller and a broker-dealer
acting on behalf of such seller is generally outside the scope of this discussion.
222 See Robert T. Greene, Note, Differential Commissions as a Material Fact, 34 EMORY
LJ. 507, 513 n.35; see also WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 2-40.
223 See Patricia A. O'Hara, The Elusive Concept of Control in Churning Claims Under Federal Securities & Commodities Law, 75 GEo. Lj. 1875, 1877 n.5 (1987); WOLFSON, supra note
95, at 2-40.
224 See Greene, supra note 222, at 513; O'Hara, supra note 223, at 1876-79; Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172-73 (2d Cir. 1970).
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and confidence with regard to her customers.2 s The SEC's position thus recognizes the broker-dealer's discretion to function
either as an agent or a principal in an OTC transaction. Exercise
of this discretion, however, may result in conflicts of interest that
may, among other things, allow broker-dealers the opportunity to
conceal information from their customers. Consequently, the SEC
is unlikely to accept the broker-dealer's claim that there was no
agency relationship-and thus no fiduciary position assumed by
the broker-dealer-simply because the transaction was executed in
the OTC market with the broker-dealer acting as a principal in
the sale. Instead, the SEC, and the courts, generally look to the
totality of the circumstances to decide whether a fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence was established between the parties."5 Once the brokerage relationship is found to exist, the parameters of this brokerage relationship are governed by both agency law principles arising under state law and various doctrines
developed under the federal securities laws. These doctrines, which
are described in the remainder of this subpart of Part IV.C., form
an integral part of the established legal framework that governs
the brokerage relationship. As such, these principles must be incorporated into the standard for determining a broker-dealer's
exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2).
(b) The Shingle Theoy.-One of the most important principles
that applies to the brokerage relationship under the federal securities laws is the SEC-developed doctrine known as the "shingle theory."
Under the shingle theory, when a broker-dealer enters the
securities business (hangs out her shingle), she implies that she
will deal fairly with her customers.227 In its earliest formulation,

225 See WOLmsoN, supra note 95, at 2-40.
226 Clearly, if a broker-dealer acts as an investment adviser to a client or manages a
client's brokerage account pursuant to discretionary authority, these activities create a fiduciary relationship between the broker-dealer and her customer. See Hughes v. SEC, 27
S.E.C. 629, 634-39 (1948), aft'd, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); WOLFSON, supra note 95,
at 2-40 to -41.
227 For an early discussion of the shingle theory, see generally Douglas & Bates, supra
note 110; Laylin K. James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624 (1934). See also
Arnold S. Jacobs, Wat Is a Misleading Statement Or Omission Under Rule 10b-57, 42
FoRDHAM L REVIEW 243 (1973). The prevention and elimination of manipulative, deceptive and fraudulent practices in the securities markets is a prime objective of the federal
securities laws. Thus, section 12(2) extends civil remedies to investors who are induced to
purchase securities, whether or not subject to registration under the 1933 Act, by false or
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the shingle theory prevented excessive pricing of securities by
holding that a broker impliedly represented that she will deal
fairly with her customers, which includes the obligation to charge
a fair price. Thus, the SEC's earliest application of the shingle
theory prevented payment of excessive compensation to brokerdealers.2"
The SEC subsequently relied on the shingle theory to address
boiler room operations.2" In an early case, Charles Hughes & Co.
v. SEC,' the court relied on the shingle theory in concluding
that high pressure sales tactics used in the broker-dealer's sales of
certain OTC securities (today, such securities are generally referred to as "penny stocks""') violated the broker-dealer's implied representation to deal fairly with her customers. The shingle
theory also has been extended to address cases involving unauthorized trading, including "churning" violations. 2 In addition to
violating the broker-dealer's common law fiduciary duty, trading in
excess of, or in absence of, customer authority is deemed fraudumisleading statements. Rule 101>5, on the other hand, was adopted pursuant to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. The implied private remedy from this later-adopted SEC rule
is broader in its scope than the section 12(2) counterpart. Although there is substantial
overlap between the scope of these two remedies, section 12(2) is available only where
the plaintiff-investor can demonstrate that the misleading misrepresentation or omission
was communicated orally or by means of a prospectus, a subset of a substantially larger
range of conduct that may form the basis of a Rule 101>5 action. See WOLFSON, supra
note 95, at 2-40; see also supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
Rule 101>5 and section 12(2) are not restricted to broker-dealers although brokerdealers may be held to a stricter standard of care than other persons who may be covered by these provisions. This higher standard generally results from the relationship
involving trust and confidence between the Broker-Dealer Seller and her customer, which
usually is not present in many of the other buyer-seller relationships that are subject to
potential Rule lOb-5 liability exposure.
228 The shingle theory therefore prevents excessive compensation, whether in the
form of commissions where the broker-dealer acts in a broker capacity, or in the form of
excessive mark-ups or mark-downs where the broker-dealer executes the transaction as a
principal. See Merritt, Vickers, Inc. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1965); JENNINGS, supra
note 6, at 578-80.
229 "A boiler room operation is a high-pressure selling campaign for a particular
block of securities of a single issuer (frequently intrinsically worthless) usually carried out
by long distance telephone." JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 620.
230 Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944).
231 For further background regarding recent history of abuses in the market for penny stocks, see generally HousE COMM'N ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, PENNY STOCK REFORM
Acr OF 1990, H.R. Rep. 101-617, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-35 (1990).
232 Mark C. Jensen, Abuse of Discretion Claims Under Rul 10b-5: Churning, Unsuitability
and Unauthorized Transactions, 18 SEC. REG. LJ. 374 (1991); C. Edward Fletcher, Learning
to Live with the Federal Arbitration Act-Securities Litigation in a Post McMahon World, 37 EMORY
LJ. 99, 124-25 (1988).
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lent, thereby creating liability for churning under Rule lOb-5 and

perhaps under section 12(2) as well. 53
For purposes of evaluating the broker-dealer's reasonable care
defense under section 12(2), the most important application of
the shingle theory probably has arisen in connection with the pro-

priety of a broker-dealer's statements promoting an issuer and its
securities. The SEC maintains:
[I]n his dealings with his customers, [a broker-dealer]
impliedly represents that opinions and predictions
about stock which he is recommending rest upon
actual knowledge and careful consideration. Under
the "shingle theory," the requirement of a reasonable
basis extends to the recommendation itself. The Commission [has] held ...
that the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws "contemplate, at the
least, that recommendations of a security made to
proposed purchasers shall have a reasonable basis
and that they shall be accompanied by disclosure of
known or easily ascertainable facts bearing upon the
justification for the representation." Correspondingly,

233 Since section 12(2) is not generally interpreted as imposing an affirmative disclosure obligation on the defendant-seller, the churning cases that presumably would be
subject to section 12(2) liability necessarily must involve oral (or written) communications
between the customer and his broker-dealer that misrepresented or omitted material
facts. Mere allegations of deceptive practices not involving such communications presumably would not create section 12(2) liability (even though liability may lie under Rule
10b-5) unless the shingle theory was used to establish liability based on the brokerdealer's conduct in violation of her implied representation to deal fairly with her customer. This qualification on broker-dealer liability is drawn from the fact that section 12(2)
imposes liability for material omissions only where the omitted fact is necessary to make
the statements made by the seller not misleading. Under the sfiingle theory, the brokerdealer impliedly represents that she will deal fairly with her customers. Therefore, her
conduct involved in churning a customer's account may be viewed as a breach of this
implied representation, thereby creating the basis for liability under section 12(2). See
Hansen, supra note 11, at 198; supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
These more recent applications of the shingle theory have led to criticism of the
theory as being too broad in creating liability by use of "implied representations." See 8
Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 32, at 3777-79. Some observers claim the theory could potentially be applied to any act or course of conduct which the SEC and the courts believe that broker-dealers should not perform. See, e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 2-51.
However, the shingle theory, at least for purposes of this Article's analysis of the
scope of section 12(2)'s affirmative defense, should avoid the substance of these criticisms
since it is being used to determine the scope of a broker-dealer's obligation to conduct a
reasonable investigation for purposes of deciding whether she has exercised reasonable
care. This more narrow use of the shingle theory should mitigate these criticisms.
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the Commission has held that when a broker-dealer
lacks adequate information to support a recommendation, it is a violation of the fraud rules to fail to
disclose to customers the "lack of such information
and [to fail to caution them] ... as to the risk involved in purchasing the stock without such information.'
Furthermore, this particular application of the shingle theory
"creates a concomitant duty of 'reasonable investigation' on the
part of broker-dealers . . . ."
Thus, whenever a broker-dealer
recommends a security, or otherwise makes representations or
expresses opinions concerning the issuer or its securities, she must
have a reasonable basis for doing so."s
The extent of the investigation required of the broker-dealer
to demonstrate factual support for her recommendation or opinion varies with the type of security and the nature of the representation, opinion, or recommendation that she makes to her customer. The duty of investigation is most imperative where a brokerdealer, by means of optimistic predictions and enthusiastic recommendations, seeks to persuade an investor to purchase securities of
an unseasoned issuer. In such circumstances, the broker-dealer can
satisfy the reasonable basis requirement, imposed as an extension
of the shingle theory, only by making a searching inquiry into the
affairs of the issuer."'
With regard to well-established issuers, on the other hand, the
broker-dealer generally can rely on the information provided in
the issuer's shareholder reports, or its other 1934 Act filings, to
supply the reasonable basis for her recommendations to her customers. "Where a broker-dealer seeks to make broad dissemination
of a recommendation, however, it is advisable for the broker-deal-

234 WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 2-26 (quoting In re Best Sec., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934
(1966) and In re Shearson, Hammill & Co., 42 S.E.C. 811, 834 (1965)). See also Hanley v.
SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
235 See WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 2-30; Denis Rice, Recommendations by a Broker-Dealk.
The Requirement for a Reasonable Basis, 25 MERcER L. REv. 537 (1974).
236 If a broker-dealer does not recommend or solicit the purchase but acts only as
an agent for the buyer in executing an unsolicited order, at least one court has recognized that the broker-dealer has only a minimal duty, if any, to buttress her responses to
the customer's inquiries by making an independent investigation. Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer
& Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 289 (E.D. La. 1974), af'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975). See
also WOLFSON, supra note 95, at 2-30 to -31.
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See WOLFSON supra note 95, at 2-31.
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er to conduct an examination of current SEC filings and contact
the issuer..,
to verify the continued reliability of this
information. '
If inconsistencies or other warning signals surface during the course of this examination, further independent
investigation may be required to provide accurate information to
satisfy the reasonable basis requirement imposed on broker-dealers
under the shingle theory. 9
The shingle theory, and its extension to impose a reasonable
basis requirement on the broker-dealer in" connection with her
dealings with her customers, has clear implications for determining
the scope of the Broker-Dealer Seller's exercise of reasonable care
under section 12(2). The implications of the shingle theory for
this analysis are taken up below and are examined in the context
of the fact pattern alleged in the Ballay case.
(c) The Suitability Docthine.-The suitability doctrine is another
important principle arising under the federal securities law that
further defines the scope of a broker-dealer's responsibility to her
customers. 2' Essentially, the suitability doctrine requires that the
broker-dealer recommend for purchase by her customer only those
securities that are suitable for this customer in light of his investment needs, financial situation, and overall financial objectives.
Moreover, the suitability doctrine has been interpreted to require
the broker-dealer to undertake an affirmative investigation into
her client's background so as to ascertain the information necessary to formulate appropriate recommendations.24

238 Id. at 2-32.
239 Id. Moreover, under the shingle theory, if a broker-dealer's recommendations go
beyond information provided in established, authoritative sources, the broker-dealer has
the affirmative obligation to thoroughly check the basis for such information and to document its reliability for the record.
240 &e JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 639-42; F. Harris Nichols, The Broker's Duty to His
Customer Under Evolving Federal Fiduciary and Suitability Standards, 26 BuFF. L REv. 435
(1977); Arvid E. Roach II, Suitability Obligations of Brokers, 29 HASTINGS LJ. 1067 (1978);
Greene, supra note 222, at 522-23; Sam Miller & Robert Popper, Discount Broker's Obligalions Under the 'Suitability" Doctrine 5 INSIGHTS 7 (Nov. 1991).
241 This obligation is clearly set forth in the NXSE's know-thy-customer-rule, Rule 405,
2 NYSE Guide (CCH) 1 2405, at 3696 (1984) and has been inferred from the NASD's
rule obligating its members to make suitable recommendations, Article III, Section 2,
NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2152, at 2041 (1993). Sea also JENNINGS, supra note 6, at 639-40.
Although it is not clear whether there is any implied liability for violating the rules of
the self-regulating organizations, it may be a moot question because most broker-dealer
violations of the suitability rules could be enforced as Rule 10b-5 claims. See WOLFSoN,
supra note 95, at 2-36. Alternatively such violations will usually form the basis for a
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For purposes of analyzing the Broker-Dealer Seller's affirmative defense under section 12(2), the suitability doctrine has the
most relevance in situations involving the broker-dealer's representations to her customer about the appropriateness (or "suitability") of a particular security for a particular customer. In such
situations, the suitability doctrine requires the broker-dealer to
collect detailed information regarding her customer's investment
objectives and current financial situation before recommending the
purchase of a particular security in furtherance of that client's investment goals.242
Like the shingle theory, the suitability doctrine forms the basis
for imposing a reasonable investigation burden on the BrokerDealer Seller that must be completed before the customer's purchase of a particular security., Obviously, the focus of the investigative burden imposed on the Broker-Dealer Seller under the suitability doctrine is on (i) ascertaining the customer's investment
objectives, and (ii) in light of this knowledge, making appropriate
investment recommendations to the customer.24 3 In connection
with any recommendations for purchase of specific securities by
her customer, the shingle theory presumably will also be implicated to assure that the Broker-Dealer Seller can demonstrate a reasonable basis for any representations made by her about the recommended security. In such a situation, the basis for the BrokerDealer Seller's reasonable care defense under section 12(2) should
implicate both the shingle theory and the suitability doctrine.
(d) The Nature of the Misrepresented or Omitted Fact.-The suitability doctrine will be most directly relevant in those section 12(2)
suits where the plaintiff-buyer sues her broker-dealer for making

breach of fiduciary claim under state law agency principles. Id.
242 SeeJENNINGS, supra note 6, at 640; WOYSON, supra note 95, at 2-35 (quoting from
Exchange Act Release No. 7984, at 2-3 (Oct. 25, 1966)). (-rhe suitability of [a brokerdealer's] recommendations must be judged in the light of the information available ...
at the time of the recommendation and not by reference to subsequent events.").
243 Ascertaining customers' objectives requires broker-dealers to conduct an affirmative
investigation of their customers' situation and financial needs. Any such investigation involves information that is readily accessible to the parties to the transaction. This is unlike the situation presented' in Bailay, upon which this Article focuses. In BaUay, the relevant issue is whether the broker-dealer must make an affirmative investigation into matters largely in control of an unrelated third party (i.e., the issuer, Wickes) in order to
support its claim that it acted reasonably in the preparation and distribution of information relating to the intrinsic value of the issuer's securities.
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inappropriate recommendations to the buyer in light of the plain-

tiff-customer's financial situation and needs.244
In defending against such a suit, the scope of the BrokerDealer Seller's reasonable care defense must take into account the
affirmative obligations imposed on the broker-dealer under the
suitability doctrine. This includes the need to conduct a reasonable investigation into the customer's investment interests and
objectives. As such, this class of statements is most likely to give
rise to a section 12(2) lawsuit in those secondary market situations
involving a broker-dealer as the seller-defendant because the suitability doctrine under the federal securities laws is generally implicated only in the context of the brokerage relationship.
For purposes of analyzing the section 12(2) affirmative defense of reasonable care, however, this Article has focused primarily on statements of material fact that relate to the intrinsic value of
the issuer's securities. 24 Where the Broker-Dealer Seller touts a
particular security to her customer, she incurs an obligation to
conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts necessary to support any claims that the Broker-Dealer Seller seeks to make about
the issuer and its securities. The basis for this investigative burden
arises out of the shingle theory. As discussed earlier, the scope of
the Broker-Dealer Seller's required investigation in this, situation
will depend on a number of factors including the nature of the
issuer, the, nature of the statement to be made, and the nature of
the relationship between the issuer and the Broker-Dealer Seller.

246

(e) The Broker-Dealer's Role in the Trading Transaction.-The shingle theory arises out of the brokerage relationship that exists between the customer and his Broker-Dealer Seller, and accordingly
further refines the scope of the Broker-Dealer Seller's reasonable
care defense. The plaintiff-investor, however, may only sue a broker-dealer who qualifies as a "seller" for purposes of section 12(2)
and who must satisfy the Pinter criteria in order to be considered

244 See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text discussing concept of materiality.
245 A frequent basis for section 12(2) suits involves claims that go fundamentally to
the intrinsic value of securities, and, accordingly, that has been the focus of this Article.
See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. It bears emphasizing, however, that the
scope of the reasonable care defense will vary according to the nature of the misrepresented or omitted fact.
246 See supra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
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a proper defendant in a section 12(2) suit.247 Thus,, the reasonable care defense of section 12(2) as applied to the Broker-Dealer
Seller's secondary market transactions will be further influenced by
her involvement in the underlying transaction. The nature of this
involvement generally falls within one of the following four charac2
terizations: 1
(i) As PrincipaL,-If the broker-dealer owns the securities
and makes fraudulent sales of the securities to her customers,
then the broker-dealer is the seller of the securities and the plaintiff-buyer may sue her under section 12(2) .24 The scope of reasonable care required to sustain the section 12(2) reasonable care
defense will be further refined by examining the nature of the
brokerage relationship, if any, that may exist between the plaintiffbuyer and this Broker-Dealer Seller.2 °
(ii) As Agent for Seller.-In this situation, a fiduciary relationship exists as between the actual owner of the securities (the
principal) and the broker-dealer who acts as his agent in locating
the buyer. This broker-dealer nonetheless should qualify as a section 12(2) seller even though she is selling securities owned by
another person." Therefore, if this broker-dealer makes material
misstatements or omits facts necessary to make statements made by
her during the course of locating a buyer for these securities not
misleading, the broker-dealer will incur liability under section
12(2) to the buyer. 2 But, what if there were no misleading
communications between the buyer and the broker-dealer acting
exclusively as agent for the seller? In such a case, there may be no
basis for finding a fiduciary relationship between the broker-dealer
and the buyer. In light of the absence of any facts showing direct

247 See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
248 See generally 17A HicKs, supra note 76, at 6-121 to -131.
249 See, e.g., Yanceski v. E.F. Hutton, 581 F. Supp. 88, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1983). This analysis would seem to hold true irrespective of whether the Broker-Dealer was acting as market-maker or simply selling as a principal out of an inventory she may hold. See William
Fisher, Parsing Pinter Four Years Later, 21 SEc. REG. L.J. 46, 51 (1993). What if, however,
the broker-dealer had engaged in a riskless principal transaction? In other words, the
broker-dealer purchased from a market-maker and turned around and sold the securities
to her customer? In both situations, the broker-dealer presumably would be treated as a
seller. See 17A Hics, supra note 76, at 6-121 to -122.
250 The existence and nature of the brokerage relationship will be governed by the
criteria previously described in this subpart of Part IV.C.
251 See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
252 See Cady v. Murphy, 113 F.2d 988, 990 (1st Cir.), cet. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
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contact between the broker-dealer and the buyer, there seems to
be little support for applying the reasonable basis requirement or
any other aspect of the shingle theory to this sales transaction. If
there were any evidence of direct dealings between the brokerdealer (acting as agent for the seller) and the buyer, presumably
this sales transaction would then shade into the next category with
the broker-dealer acting in a dual agency capacity.
(iii) As Agent for Both Buyer and Seller.-There is at least
one case which found the broker-dealer to be a "seller" in a transaction in which she acted as agent for both the buyer and the
actual owner/seller of the securities involved in that transaction.' 5 This conclusion is entirely consistent with the Pinter analysis since where the broker-dealer divides her loyalty between the
owner of the securities and the prospective buyer, she is still performing services for, and collecting a fee from, the seller. Thus,
this broker-dealer qualifies as a seller under the Pinter analysis.
Nevertheless, because there is factual support for finding a fiduciary relationship between the buyer and this Broker-Dealer Seller, the
broker-dealer's exercise of reasonable care for purposes of .establishing her section 12(2) affirmative defense must be analyzed in
light of the shingle theory and its reasonable basis requirement, as
well as'the other doctrines applicable in the context of the brokerage relationship.
(iv) As Agent for Buyer.-Where the broker-dealer acts as
agent for the buyer, there is generally factual support for finding
that the broker-dealer occupies a fiduciary relationship with the
buyer. However, can this broker-dealer be treated as a "seller" for
purposes of section 12(2)? At first blush, this would seem to be a
case of doublespeak.' Nonetheless, the policy basis of the 1933
Act suggests that some broker-dealers may be treated as sellers for
purposes of section 12(2), even though they act exclusively as the
buyer's agent in connection with the transaction."

253 S e id. at 990-91; 17A HiCs, supra note 76, at 6-122.
254 See Cady, 113 F.2d at 991; Vogel-Lorber, Inc. v. Options on Shares, Inc., [1974-75]
Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
94,911, at 97,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 17A HicKs, supra note 76,
at 6-123.
255 See Boehm v. Granger, 42 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1943), affd per cuiam, 50
N.Y.S.2d 845 (App. Div. 1944); see also Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1053
(2d Cir. 1969) (in dicta, court suggested that a broker acting exclusively as buyer's agent
in a transaction nonetheless could qualify as a seller if it was found to have actively solic-
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Applying These Doctrines to Define the Scope of the BrokerDealer's Section 12(2) Reasonable Care Defense: The Ballay
Case

Where the broker-dealer acts exclusively as a principal (i.e. in
a dealer capacity only) and renders no advice to the customer,
presumably no agency relationship is established, and therefore,
the fiduciary doctrines described above should not apply to define
the analysis required under section 12(2) as to the Broker-Dealer
Seller's exercise of reasonable care. The absence of any fiduciary
position is important in establishing the scope of the Broker-Dealer Seller's obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation into
the underlying basis for any claims the issuer may have published
and which in turn form the basis for any investment advice the
broker-dealer may have disseminated.
Accordingly, where the broker-dealer can establish that in a
given transaction she acted only as a principal, in an arms-length,
bargained-for sale, which the broker-dealer did not solicit and
which was otherwise wholly devoid of any attributes of the traditional brokerage relationship, the broker-dealer should have a very
narrow responsibility to take affirmative steps to substantiate her
compliance with the shingle theory and the suitability doctrine.'
As described earlier in this Part, both of these doctrines are quite
important in defining the scope of a broker-dealer's obligation to
her customer under the federal securities law and in turn further

ited the plaintiff-customer's offer to buy); Quincy Coop. Bank v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
655 F. Supp. 78, 84 (D. Mass. 1986). But see Fischer, supra note 69, at 65-66, citing to
Cox v. Eicheler, 765 F. Supp. 601, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Craighead v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 899 F.2d 485, 493 (6th Cir. 1990).
256 Even here, though, the Broker-Dealer Seller may incur an albeit more limited
obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation where there are suspicious circumstances
that provide constructive notice to the broker-dealer. This more narrow analysis of section 12(2) might apply in situations involving the broker-dealer's execution of a
customer's unsolicited order although this analysis must be tempered by at least two considerations: (i) whether the broker-dealer is a market-maker in the underlying security;
and (ii) whether there is some reasonable expectation created on the part of the customer simply because the seller occupies broker-dealer status. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Fraud & Deception by Securities Profesional4, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1279-83 (1983). However, neither of these considerations seems relevant where there is no omission or misrepresentation to form the basis for a section 12(2) complaint, as where the suit is over a
complaint of market manipulation by the Broker-Dealer Seller, unaccompanied by any
claims of misrepresentation or non-disclosure. But see supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text discussing the concept of implied misrepresentation which may provide the substantive basis for actionable misconduct under section 12(2).
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refine the analysis of the Broker-Dealer Seller's exercise of reasonable care under section 12(2) in a secondary market transaction.
Neither of these doctrines should apply, however, in the absence
of some evidence of a relationship of trust and confidence.
In Ballay, Legg Mason, as the Broker-Dealer Seller, published
and disseminated research reports and engaged in oral communications as well regarding the issuer and its operations to prospective buyers, ostensibly for the purpose of inducing its customers to
purchase Wickes securities in the 'secondary markets using the
services of Legg Mason for which the firm would be compensated.
In situations such as this, the section 12(2) reasonable care defense imposes on the Broker-Dealer Seller some obligation to
conduct a reasonable investigation of the issuer and its business
operations. The remainder of this Part focuses therefore on the
contours of the section 12(2) reasonable care defense as applied
to Legg Mason, the Broker-Dealer Seller, for the purpose of further refining the extent of any reasonable investigation requirement that might be necessary to establish the firm's exercise of
reasonable care in connection with its activities in the trading
markets.
In Ballay, Legg Mason supplied the plaintiff-investors with
information that it had prepared regarding the value of Wickes
securities that it recommended for plaintiffs' purchase,25 consistent with its "value philosophy" of investing. At the early stage of
the proceedings when the case was presented to the Third Circuit,'
the record was not fully developed concerning Legg
Mason's reasonable care defense. Nevertheless, a framework for
the appropriate analysis of Legg Mason's affirmative defense can
be set forth, based on the limited record available.
Research analysts at Legg Mason apparently took the initiative
in identifying Wickes securities as an undervalued investment. This
analysis included an estimate of the goodwill value of Wickes.
Although not specifically described in the courts' decisions, the

257 Although there are no such allegations reported in the courts' opinions, if a
plaintiff could show that Wickes securities were an inappropriate investment vehicle for
that plaintiff, then presumably the suitability doctrine would be relied on to further define the scope of the broker-dealer's responsibility to the plaintiff-investor. As the Baay
case was brought as a class action suit, presumably there was no such allegation made, as
it would not seem to be the type of claim susceptible to class action treatment.
258 The case went up on appeal on the threshold issue of whether a section 12(2)
cause of action was available to these secondary market buyers. The Third Circuit denied
this remedy to these plaintiffs.
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basis for these calculations presumably came from the issuer's published reports, including any required filings under the 1934 Act.
This estimate of value, which Legg Mason broadly disseminated to
its clients presumably to induce them to purchase Wickes securities, raises several subsidiary issues that need to be resolved in
analyzing Legg Mason's section 12(2) affirmative defense.
Irrespective of whether Legg Mason executed these customers'
orders as a dealer-principal or broker-agent, it appears that a brokerage relationship existed between Legg Mason and the plaintiffinvestors. All the investors apparently received an investment recommendation from Legg Mason and relied on this investment
advice to make their purchases. 19 Since a brokerage relationship
has been established, the shingle theory becomes relevant in fleshing out the scope of Legg Mason's responsibilities in connection
with its dissemination of a recommendation about Wickes securities.
Relying on the shingle theory to flesh out the scope of care
required of Legg Mason under section 12(2), Legg Mason should
be required to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for its
estimate of the book value of Wickes securities. To satisfy this
reasonable basis requirement, Legg Mason must show the nature
of the information on which it based its calculation. Although
much of this information presumably is publicly available since
Wickes appears to be a reporting company under the 1934 Act,
Legg Mason would want to introduce all information that it relied
on, even if some of its sources went beyond the company's public
filings.2 ° Moreover, Legg Mason has the burden to show that
this information basis is sufficient on which to make these calculations, raising further questions regarding the manner in which the
Legg Mason analysts made their calculations of value. In this regard, Legg Mason should be required to show, at a minimum,
that the analysts acted carefully (i.e., non-negligently within industry standards) in making these calculations, presumably by showing

259 Generally, rendering investment advice is sufficient to support a finding that a
brokerage relationship existed between the Broker-Dealer Seller and the plaintiff-buyer.
See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
260 It would appear to be to Legg Mason's advantage to demonstrate the thoroughness of its analysts' efforts by introducing all documentation that supports their efforts,
such as information gleaned from interviews with company officials, etc. and any other
non-public sources of information. These possible sources may, however, raise other concerns, such as the propriety of the firm's receipt of this information. But these other
concerns, including the possibility of Rule 101>5 liability in connection with an analyst's
communications with issuer's management, lie outside the scope of this Article.
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that they acted reasonably in gathering and using the appropriate
amount of information on which to base these calculations.
At this point, the shingle theory, as it defines the Broker-Dealer Seller's reasonable care defense, imposes an investigative burden on Legg Mason to show that it had sufficient information
upon which to make its value calculations in a non-negligent fashion. Satisfying this burden likewise may require Legg Mason to go
beyond the information contained in Wickes public filings. The
scope of this affirmative obligation will in turn presumably depend
on a number of factors, such as the staleness of the publicly available information, the type of calculations to be performed by the
analysts at Legg Mason, and the acknowledged reliability and completeness of the information possessed by Legg Mason analysts.
Finally, Legg Mason, as part of its affirmative defense, must
establish that it had no reason to doubt the veracity of the information that formed the basis of the raw data used in its estimate
of the value of Wickes securities. In connection with this showing,
certain criteria become quite important in determining the scope
of any required investigation on the part of Legg Mason, such as
the nature of the issuer (well-established or unseasoned) and the
nature of any relationship between the issuer and the firm (prior
dealings as advisor to company or market-maker status that might
give this broker-dealer greater access to, or insight about, the company and its affairs). Furthermore, if Legg Mason were aware of
any suspicious facts or circumstances sufficient to give rise to constructive notice, Legg Mason would incur an obligation to go beyond the available information and investigate the continued reliability of the information used in its analysts' calculations of the
value of the issuer's securities.2"6'
The extent of this investigative burden presumably is enhanced where, as here, the Broker-Dealer Seller intends to broadly
disseminate its recommendations to its customers.262 In such situations, caution dictates that the broker-dealer may want to un-

261 The scope of this investigation will be determined by the nature of the suspicious
facts or circumstances that created constructive notice. If an appropriate investigation
cannot be made, as where the issuer refuses to cooperate or other obstacles are encountered, the broker-dealer must at a minimum make disclosure of these difficulties and any
infirmities that may be created thereby, and perhaps may even be required to refrain
from disseminating any estimates of value in order that the broker-dealer be in a position to show that she exercised reasonable care for purposes of preserving her section 12(2) defense.
262 See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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dertake a searching inquiry to verify information, even publicly
available information. This burden presumably is further enhanced
where, as in Ballay, there is some evidence suggesting that the
issuer is a financially troubled entity. The reasonable basis obligation, imposed on Broker-Dealer Sellers as an extension of the
shingle theory, is presumably only strengthened in cases where
evidence suggests that the issuer is financially distressed.
V.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with the flexible approach historically used by the
courts, the nature of the seller provides the starting point in analyzing the affirmative defense expressly provided by Congress in
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act. In connection with trading activity
occurring in the secondary markets, prospective sellers can be
divided for the most part into three classes of prospective section
12(2) defendants: Ordinary Sellers, Control Person Sellers, and
Broker-Dealer Sellers.
With respect to section 12(2) claims involving materially misleading statements relating to the intrinsic value of the issuer or
its securities, the liability of Ordinary Sellers under section 12(2)
should be the most remote of the three prospective classes of
defendant-sellers for two principal reasons. Ordinary Sellers generally are quite removed from any meaningful access to sources of
material information about the issuer. Furthermore, secondary
market transactions involving Ordinary Sellers usually do not create the basis for any relationship of trust and confidence that
might give rise to an affirmative duty to make some investigation
to establish the seller's exercise of reasonable care for purposes of
section 12(2).
The Control Person Seller, on the other hand, generally will
bear a heavy burden in demonstrating her exercise of reasonable
care. By virtue of her control relationship with the issuer, this
seller generally has superior access to information about the issuer
and its business affairs. Similarly, her position may give rise to
state law imposed duties, possibly including fiduciary duties, that
may expand the scope of care required of the Control Person
Seller to include a reasonable investigation obligation.
The most complex analysis of the reasonable care defense,
however, occurs in connection with the trading activities of BrokerDealer Sellers in the secondary markets. Generally, these sellers
occupy some position of trust and confidence with respect to the
secondary market buyer. As a result of this relationship, the Bro-
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ker-Dealer Seller is subject to fiduciary duty principles arising under common law as well as the federal securities laws. These doctrines further refine the scope of reasonable care that a BrokerDealer Seller must exercise to preserve her section 12(2) affirmative defense. The application of these principles, as well as otherfactors described in this Article that are inherent in the brokerage
relationship, serve to further refine the scope of the Broker-Dealer
Seller's section 12(2) affirmative defense in a manner that is entirely consistent with the established doctrines that otherwise govern the securities trading activities of Broker-Dealer Sellers.
This flexible framework for analyzing the section 12(2) reasonable care defense is consistent with the negligence standard
suggested by the express language of the statute. Furthermore, the
analytical approach set forth in this Article supports the view that
section 12(2) relief extends to secondary market buyers. The
seller's affirmative defense, along with the other required elements
of a section 12(2) cause of action, will act as a meaningful barrier
to unmeritorious litigation in the event that the Supreme Court
ultimately concludes that defrauded secondary market buyers may
sue their sellers under this provision. Indeed, the analytical
framework for conceptualizing the reasonable care defense of
section 12(2) described in this Article should provide meaningful
guidance to secondary market sellers, especially Broker-Dealer
Sellers, in structuring their trading activities to preserve their affirmative defense and thereby avoid the prospect of draconian damages awards otherwise feared to result from the extension of section 12(2) to purchasers in the secondary markets.

